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―A Estética do Sofrimento na Fotografia Contemporânea. O corpo de Dor nas Obras de Kir 
Esadov e Yuri Kozyrev‖ 
Resumo 
O sofrimento é uma experiência universal. Todos os seres humanos sofrem, mas as diferenças 
culturais geram significados particulares e respostas específicas ao sofrimento. No entanto, é 
o corpo o locus exato da dor e do sofrimento. A maneira como é visto o corpo influencia a 
forma como a dor é sentida e expressada. Assistir, olhar para a dor dos outros tornou-se parte 
da existência humana, particularmente relevante após os eventos de 11 de Setembro de 2001. 
Ao longo dos séculos, a dor e o sofrimento foram sempre presentes, bem ancorados na área da 
arte. Muitos artistas aproximaram-se da sua doença pintando-a, esculpindo-a ou fotografando-
a. Apesar de nesta dissertação estiver muito cuidadosa a não romantizar a arte como um 
instrumento de cura, no entanto, reconheço que pensando e representando a dor significa 
assumir as suas conotações positivas. A prática fotográfica é muitas vezes utilizada por 
artistas como uma forma de terapia pessoal.  
A tese critica a tendência de localizar a dor dentro de uma parte específica do corpo, 
reforçando a perspectiva de que esta é moldada pelo contexto individual e socio-cultural A 
fotografia aparece com o papel de resistir à medicalização da dor e do sofrimento. 
A pesquisa analisa como a fotografia é usada como meio de construção da identidade e 
instrumento de intervenção. 
Termos-chave: corpo, dor, doença, guerra, terapia, fotografia.  
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Abstract 
Suffering is a universal experience. All humans suffer, but cultural differences can lend quite 
different meanings to that suffering and to the response it is due. However, it is the body the 
precise locus of suffering. How one regards the body influences the way how pain is 
experienced and expressed. Regarding the pain of others has become part of human existence. 
It became particularly relevant after the events on September 11, 2001.  
Over the centuries, pain and suffering have always been expressed in art. Many artists‘ way to 
appropriate their disease was/is to paint it, sculpt it or photograph it. While I am very careful 
about romanticizing art as a sublime healing tool, I nevertheless recognize that thinking of 
pain, is a step forward into assuming the positivity of it. Photographic practice is often used 
by artists as a personal form of therapy.  
I am critical of the tendency to localize pain within specific bodily parts, rather than 
understanding pain as shaped by both individual and the particular socio-cultural context. Too 
many such attitudes to pain are emblematic of its medicalization.  
The research describes how photography can be used as a means of identity construction and 
a health care intervention. 
Keywords: body, pain, illness, war, therapy, photography.   
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INTRODUCTION 
State of the art 
The experience of pain presents a complex interaction of neurological, emotional, cognitive, 
social, and cultural factors. As pain experiences are lived in the body non-verbally, visual 
approaches are often used for the assessment of pain. Over the centuries, pain and suffering 
have always been expressed in art. Due to its symbolic character, for some people, artistic 
expression makes easier the transmission of certain aspects of pain and trauma that cannot 
easily be expressed in words. According to psychoanalyses, the symbolic expression is 
indirect, causing less anxiety and thus providing more security than verbal communication. 
Pain is defined as ―an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or 
potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage (Merskey, 1994). What this 
definition highlights is firstly the unpleasantness of pain. It goes without saying that, 
standardly, pain is something we would rather be without. This corresponds with the fact that 
pain is depicted in both medical advertisement and the visual arts as a turning of the body 
inside out.  
Many artists‘ way to appropriate their disease is to paint it, sculpt it or photograph it. At 
times, the narrative of the suffering body is far from linear, rejecting the myth of progress, 
self- improvement and eventually the victory over pain or disease. It has mostly been the 
narrative of heroism, sacrifice and courage that has scored highly in contemporary Western 
art. Images in Western art and culture (i.e. passion of Christ) centred on pain, served as 
objects of contemplation mostly when pain was mythologized. Carnage has become a 
successful iconographic subject also nowadays. From etchings of Goya (Los Caprichos, 
1799; Disasters of War, 1810-20) to the seventeenth century devotional sculpture, from 
videos of Bill Viola (Nantes Triptych, 1992; The Passions, 2000) to works of Anish Kapoor 
(Marsyas, 2002), pain has long been penetrating art.  
 Scarry claims that art is connected to pain already on an ontological level (Scarry, 1985). She 
points out the counter-dependence of the concepts of pain and imagining, between which the 
subject is positioned. Representing pain is a very delicate issue as it requires obeying a certain 
ethics. Sontag postulated that the only people with the right to look at images of suffering are 
those who are able to alleviate it or who could learn from it, the rest being simply voyeurs, 
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whether conscious or not (Sontag, 2003). According to Sontag, illness is linked to creativity 
and accompanied by certain aesthetics of destruction, the peculiar beauty of havoc and chaos, 
making one see the physical constraints as a basis for the hope of overcoming them. While I 
am very careful about romanticizing art as a sublime healing tool, I nevertheless recognize 
that thinking of pain, instead of denying it, is a step forward into assuming the positivity of it.  
The themes of suffering, illness, death and the end of existence are subjects treated with great 
importance by artists. Such artworks are often reconstructions of scenes from literature or 
historical events, but there are also paintings that have the value of a private meditation or a 
simple homage, works meant to serve as companions during the long, silent hours of illness.  
Photographic practice is often used by artists as a personal form of therapy. Also, 
photographic activity could be seen as a political, deconstructive strategy in denaturalizing 
photographic realism and redefining artistic and social practice. In this sense, the 
representation is a space of conflict and social struggle, a means of regaining control of the 
own image.  
Central to the concept of pain is the Cartesian binary, issuing a call to our intellectual 
capacities to explain what is happening to the suffering body. The concept of pain 
predominates in modern culture, although, in his classic book The Culture of Pain, David 
Morris puzzles over the lack of knowledge about pain that, in his assessment, represents the 
most significant illiteracy of Western culture (Morris, 1991). In his argument, Morris opposes 
the tendency to strip pain of its cultural and social relevance. Similarly, Bendelow and 
Williams are critical of the tendency to localize pain within specific bodily parts and perceive 
it solely as a result of an elaborate broadcasting system of system of signals activated by a 
failure or dysfunction in the machine of a human body and its organs, rather than 
understanding pain as shaped by both individual and the particular socio-cultural context 
(Bendelow&Williams, 1995). Too many such attitudes to pain are emblematic of its 
medicalization.  
The universality of the experience of suffering has elicited a variety of responses, both 
theoretical and practical in nature. All religious and soteriological systems constitute, in some 
form, a response to the problem of suffering and the human condition. Pain lodged at the core 
of human experience: pain feared, pain avoided, pain inflicted, pain endured, pain savoured 
and pain regarded.  
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Key studies that seek to understand the enormity of human suffering include works such as 
Elaine Scarry‘s ―The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World‖ (Oxford 
University Press, 1985) and Arthur Kleinman‘s ―Writing at the Margin. Discourse between 
Anthropology and Medicine (University of California Press, 1995). Both are based in the 
literature on the sociology of knowledge and the anthropology of medicine but lack a 
grounding in the long view of the history of religions out of which fundamental notions of 
―the suffering body‖ have emerged in Asian as well as Western contexts.  
The research proposes to answer to the following questions, less approached in the literature 
of specialty so far: 
- What are the specific techniques with wich is represented the suffering body?  
- What are the transformations, the manipulations, the new shapes the body in pain 
suffers during its transposition into the visual language? 
-  Is there an essential, idiosyncratic relationship between the representation of the body 
in pain and medium used, namely, photography?  
Objectives: 
 to distinguish and explain the concepts of pain, suffering, trauma; 
 to identify the theories about the representability of pain; 
 to depict artworks and analyse the ways of representing pain along history and the 
factors engaged; 
 to understand the motivation of making pain visible; 
 to explore the photography as a therapeutic tool for the artist in pain; 
 to analyse the reasons of the war photographs as images of collective trauma.  
 
Relevance of the project 
This thesis is a critique towards the over medicalization of pain, foregrounding the importance 
of thinking pain in its relation to social interactions, dominant ideology, individual location, 
and experience. The research describes how photography can be used as a means of identity 
construction and a therapeutic intervention that fosters meaning reconstruction of the painful 
experience. It focuses on the understanding of the ways in which the artist experiences and 
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visualizes the pain and secondly, how this process of meaning making through art changes his 
perspective on his painful, traumatic experience.  
Suffering is a universal experience. All humans suffer, but cultural differences can lend quite 
different meanings to that suffering and to the response it is due. In common to all, however, 
is the body the precise locus of suffering. As has become evident from many recent studies, 
our notion about the body varies depending on our social and cultural context. How one 
regards the body influences the way how pain is experienced and expressed. These variations 
are culturally conditioned and are generally articulated with reference to ideological, moral or 
religious traditions. This research will prove the cultural dimension of pain, by approaching 
artworks from different cultural context. Because suffering and its expression is a multi- faced 
phenomenon, a complex, exhaustive approach is required, fact that makes this paper an 
interdisciplinary study.  
―Regarding the Pain of Others‖has become the part of human existence (Sontag, 2003). The 
notion of visibility, or rather specularity of pain, like suffering and eventually death in front of 
many eyes, became particularly relevant after the events on September 11 2001, connecting to 
the medial character of trauma. So, a new perspecitive on pain and its representabiliy is highly 
demanded nowadays. The thesis will elucidate how art practice could be making calls for a 
rethinking of the concept of pain.  
 
Detailed description of the thesis 
Pain is a highly problematic concept. It is often claimed that intense pain cannot be processed 
and that it escapes language(Scarry, 1985); is it then my intention to process it and to find 
(visual) means to re-tell it. Our understanding of pain influences our expressivity of it. 
Language of pain is most often a language of dismay, complaint, disappointment, 
bereavement and fear. By examining paintings and photographs, I investigate how reading the 
images of pain has transformed in time and how it affects contemporary self-understanding.  
My argument is that the making (as opposed to unmaking) aspect of pain can serve as one of 
the elements of subjectivity. I see the presence of pain here as a dynamically shaping, rather 
than a passive, condition. People in pain live multiple, layered identities played out at 
crossroads of social, historical and political factors. They experience pain only and entirely as 
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they interpret it (Morris, 1991).  This struggle for an understanding of pain can be traced 
throughout history, from the purifying role of pain in Christianity to the myths built upon 
AIDS as a punishing force directed at the homosexual part of the population.  
Nowadays, the need to interpret pain is ever more urgent. Every member of Western 
civilization is surrounded by pain; his/her being is conditioned by it. Cancer, tuberculosis, 
suicide, depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, drug addiction, street or domestic violence 
and sexual abuse are ubiquitous also in the visual sphere, often blurring the notion of 
individuality and uniqueness of the experience. Exhibitions like World Press Photo promote 
that spectacularity even more, to the point where the ethics of images of condensed suffering 
become its aesthetics.  
The modes of experiencing pain and trauma are simultaneously collective and individual, 
local and global, and they are perpetually infiltrating contemporary consciousness. Studying 
the representation of pain requires a cross-disciplinary approach. Pain and its 
acknowledgement have come to be seen as dependent on our personal characteristic – 
narratives, cultural background, feelings, and mood, often regardless of the t issue damage. 
Described not only as a clinical term, but also as an aspect of war, torture, violence, sexual 
practices, metaphysical rituals, power relations and political acts of repression, pain invites an 
interdisciplinary approach. My assumption is that art could be a way to enable pain to enter 
wider shared discourse and conceptualization. My intention is not only to show how pervasive 
of a presence pain is in artistic discourse, but also to point out, since visibility is an imperative 
of contemporary social and cultural life, the ways in which pain is being made visible here. In 
addressing visual culture, my methodological assumption is that we can derive certain forms 
of knowledge on pain from visual images.  
The thesis will discuss the artworks of the Russian photographer Kir Esadov in terms of the 
expression of pain and suffering and sets out an argument for the transformative aspect of art 
within the context of art-therapy. His photographies are analysed under the aspects of pain, 
embodiment, commitment and transformation. Furthermore, the comprehension of pain 
through art is explained by hermeneutic theory, stressing the symbolic and atemporal 
character of art. Art can open the horizon for transcending the individual and present aspects 
of pain, as well as providing insights into both spectator and author.  
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The last part of the thesis will discuss the war photography, exploring in particular the work 
of Yuri Kozyrev, challenging the previous approach. How and  why is suffering and death 
represented as collective experience, will be explored taking into account the ethics of making 
trauma visible.  
  
Methodology 
I try to clarify how artists and art institutions respond, perceive and represent the disease and 
what is the special frame of contemporary art comparing to other historical moments of the 
representation of the ill. The current research methodologically engages statements from 
Michael Foucault‘s account, medical sociology and cultural and feminist theories of the body.  
Representing the disease in the arts gives birth to a very specific discourse practice which 
relies on two main issues: on one hand, the figurative problem of illness as representation, 
and, on the other hand, the broader implications of this representational field for the wider 
domain of the politics of representations. Also, it makes evident two main questions: how the 
category of ―individual patient‖ and its identity constitute the departure point of the 
representation of illness in the nowadays art; and how the aesthetic that promotes and defends 
a homophobic carnal perspective coexist with an aesthetic which aspires for recognition.  
In order to confer to the research complexity, specificity and integrity, will be engaged two 
constant perspectives. The first one, the cultural perspective, as I mentioned above, will show 
how the cultural background shapes the experience of pain and determines its code of 
representation. Second, the paper will pursue the gender perspective, gender being as a factor 
affecting the conception, production and interpretation of the artwork. The perception of pain 
is not only about the confrontation of gender, but gender can give valuable indications 
concerning the nature of one's reactions to it.  
In its beginning, the research will focus on the understanding of the problematic of pain, its 
constant visibility and the ways of representing it. On a diachronic order will be exposed 
different codes of representing pain along the history of art and the factors which produced 
changes within them. Will be distinguished and explained the terms from the same semantic 
register: pain, trauma, suffering, atrocity and others.  
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The experience of pain will be depicted as personal and then as a collective one. In the first 
context will be analysed the artworks of the Russian photographer Kir Esadov and in the 
second- the war photographs of Yury Kozyrev.  
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Ist Chapter: Representing pain: body as medium 
I.1. The Phenomenon of pain. Interpreting a universal human embodied 
experience 
 
Suffering is a universal, unavoidable experience, a human experience not because the animals would 
be deprived of it, but because they do not attribute it a special significance beyond its physiological 
component. All humans suffer and each of them constructs a unique narrative of this experience; the 
cultural differences determine the specificity of the meanings conferred to pain and the responses to it.  
These cultural differences emerge from the dominant religion in a society and influence even the 
individuals who do not share any system of religious beliefs.   
The departing point of interpreting the experience of pain in all cultural, social contexts is the 
perception of the body, this precise locus of suffering, this canvas in a permanent shaping and filling 
in. Taking into account the complexity of the factors involved, studying the suffering experiences 
requires the complicity of various approaches and perspectives. All these studies should start by 
addressing the concept of body, the body which is far more than a physical seat of pain. Our 
perception of the body is shaped by a multitude of agents: cultural location, gender, race, social class, 
age, personal trajectory. All of these factors and more influence our perspectives, not just as a group 
but also as individuals; teach us how we should live the experience of pain that would be allowed by 
the schema we are anchored in. The attitude towards the body and the phenomenon of pain determine 
whether the suffering person will exhibit shame, guilt, anger, denial, stoicism, acceptance, or even 
masochistic pleasure.  
Furthermore, certain parts of the body have a different importance and statute than others which 
implies different significance. This segregation, hierarchization of the body parts is generated by the 
wrong perception of body as not being a unity, but a functional puzzle of more fragments; especially 
the division is made between the upper part, seen as superior, sacred and the lower part of the body, 
regarded as inferior, shameful. These variations are culturally conditioned and originate in ideological, 
moral, or religious traditions. There was always an interest from the part of political, religious 
institutions to control the body, the most accessible to influence the identity construction.  
Given the diversity of the experience of pain, a large series of theoretical and practical responses was 
produced along the centuries and among cultures. All religious and soteriological systems constitute, 
in some form, a response to the problem of suffering and the human condition. People from 
everywhere were preoccupied with the causes and the purposes of suffering, sometimes elaborating 
even philosophical or poetic approaches as have proliferated in ancient Egypt, Mesopotamia, India and 
China. 
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Simultaneously with the theoretical responses, there were developed practical palliative interventions 
to alleviate pain- in particular, medical, institutionalised treatment of pain (both mental and physical); 
alternative treatments and complementary ways of healing. All forms of healing are produced in an 
immediate and direct correlation with the interpretations of roots, causes, meanings and varied 
significantly across cultural and historical contexts. As mentioned above, the selected form of 
treatment by a society at a certain moment depends on the general accepted vision on body: if it is 
regarded as a functional piece of meat including several systems of organs- then, it will be cut, sewed, 
modelled as any other object; if the body is taken as a unity, as a flux of energy perfectly integrated 
into the natural flux, then, the forms of healing would be part of the nature, considered sacred and 
dealing not with the eliminating the discomforting symptoms, but the very roots of the pain; and 
finally, if the body is perceived as the work of God made out of clay, in this case, pain means to be 
possessed by the evil forces and the treatment would consist in exorcising, or, in another historical 
time, the same religious context would encourage the suffering one with the reward of being 
sanctified, the ones in pain will get to know the heaven. Much earlier the inventions within the modern 
medicine, typical societies had medical specialists who provided treatment methods according to the 
means available to them, and, undoubtedly, according to the vision on human body and human 
condition, sometimes these methods were even astonishing. Often medical personnel were themselves 
priests or were closely associated with the religious establishment, suggesting that healing represented 
religious rituals and involved the participation of deities.  
Modern medicine, totally detached itself from the religion, involving the scientific, experimentally 
proved method, tried to homogenise and transform the vision on pain; and enabled the elaboration of 
revolutionary drugs and treatments to global populations, neglecting the local specificity, although, 
there are alternative therapies that survived and regained popularity.   
The cultural context frames the medical responses to pain materializing the existent concepts 
concerning the nature of the human being and of the human body which highlight what is defined as 
being ―healthy‖ or ―infirmed‖. Unfortunately, the cultural aspect of the medical treatment of pain is 
completely neglected by the academic approach, except sociology and anthropology of medicine.  
What kind of pain is it? Where and how does it hurt? These are the questions we ask when confronted 
with pain, in an endeavour to localize, characterize, and define the pain we experience. Central to the 
questions is the Cartesian binary, issuing a call to our intellectual capacities to explain what is 
happening to the aching body (Leder, 1998; Bendelow & Williams, 
1995). As such, the questions reveal the concept of pain that predominates in modern culture and the 
ways in which we think about pain.  
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In his classic book The Culture of Pain, David Morris (1991) puzzles over the lack of knowledge 
about pain that, in his assessment, represents the most significant illiteracy of Western culture. In his 
argument, Morris opposes the tendency to strip pain of its cultural and social relevance. Similarly, 
Bendelow and Williams (1995) are critical of the tendency to localize pain within specific bodily parts 
and perceive it solelyas a result of ―an elaborate broadcasting system of signals‖ activated by a failure 
or dysfunction in the machine of a human body and its organs, rather than understanding pain as 
―shaped both by the individual and their particular socio-cultural context‖ (Morris, 1991). To many, 
such attitudes to pain are emblematic of its medicalization. Pain undoubtedly ―belongs to the most 
basic human experiences that make us who we are‖ (Morris, 1991).  
It has been essential to approach pain not as a localized sensation, but rather as a complex emotion 
encompassing both the body and mind. Pain is not located solely in/on the individual body, but in 
contrast involves the overall situational context and a complex interaction between those who are in 
pain and those who are out of pain. Pain is a practice, both in the sense of being carried out, as well as 
in the sense of bringing about some effects, changes, or response. Briefly, pain is both done and does 
something.In approaching pain as cultural and social practice, the question no longer focuses on what 
pain is and how or where it is felt. Rather, it shifts into the area of what pain does. What effects does 
pain bring about? Further questions follow: What embodiment does pain produce? How does pain 
relate to materiality of bodies both in and out of pain?  
In the Western, ―civilized‖ cultural context, pain is predominantly referred to as the experience of 
intense and uncomfortable unfamiliarity, even estrangement from the self. Pain is felt ―as something 
‗not me‘ within ‗me‘‖ (Ahmed, 2004). According to Elaine Scarry (1985), this estrangement also 
encompasses the level of interpersonal and inter-social relations. Pain is not only bodily trauma, it 
radically affects the possibility of communication. Feeling pain, being in pain, she thinks, is an 
extreme state of existence that literally shatters the possibilities of language (Ahmed, 2004). Pain, in 
this sense, represents a ―place beyond words‖ (Hart, 1998). On a similar note, Joseph A. Kotarba 
(1983) concludes his studies into chronic pain by defining pain as a lonely experience; as a feeling that 
the subject has and others cannot have, or vice versa as a feeling that others have, yet the subject 
him/herself cannot approach. Again, it is the breach in the possibility of sharing and mutuality that for 
these authors defines the experience of pain.Ahmed argues that the sensation of pain is instrumental in 
revisiting and redrawing the bodily boundaries, the ―pain surfaces‖ (Ahmed, 2004). Likewise, Lynda 
Hart (1998) notes that pain intensifies a body‘s surface and borders. It is this increased consciousness 
of borders between individual bodies that informs the emotion of ungraspability of pain.  
In his thought-provoking book The Absent Body, Drew Leder (1990) explores the role of the 
body with regard to subjectivity. On the one hand, human experience is always embodied. On 
the other hand, in everyday life my body is seldom a thematic object of my experience. When 
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I engage in everyday interaction with others, I often do not think about my body. My body 
dis-appears from my attention. Leder differentiates between two ways in which one‘s own 
body can dis-appear from one‘s attention. He also makes a distinction between bodily dis-
appearance and dys-appearance. The latter takes place when the body appears to me as ―ill‖ or 
―bad‖ (Leder 1990). This is often the case when I experience pain or illness.  
 
My starting-point is phenomenological. I focus on how the subject experiences her or his 
body, i.e. how the body stands forth to the subject.My body is what makes relations to others 
possible. It is made meaningful to me in interactions with others and the world and it is never 
merely an object to me. It is my lived reality. This is the perspective of the lived body that the 
French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2002) writes about. ―My body‖, Merleau-
Ponty (2002, p. 167,453) says, is my ―anchorage in a world.‖ Nevertheless, my body can 
appear to me in different ways.Merleau-Ponty describes the tacit ―self-givenness‖ of the body. 
He draws attention to the fact that I am bodily self-aware even if I do not reflect on how I 
position my body or how to move it. The body is given to me as the centre of my existence.  
 
The lived body is an ambiguous mind-body unity that experiences and acts in a specific 
situation. It is our lived relationship to a world immersed in meaning, which we constantly 
interpret and make meaningful to ourselves through interaction with others. The lived body is 
someone‘s ―grasp of the world‖ (Beauvoir, 2003, p. 36). It is ―not just one thing in the world, 
but a way in which the world comes to be‖ (Leder, 1990, p. 25). Leder (1990, p. 73) suggests 
that pain effects a ―spatiotemporal constriction‖ for the subject, that acute pain make us 
experience the body-part in pain as an ―alien presence,‖ i.e. as an object other than the self 
(Leder 1990, p. 73).Alienation implies that the body (that I am) appear as other and strange to 
me. Possibly, when living with chronic pain, this experience may change its character. Of 
course, in both acute and chronic pain one may feel alienated from things that previously gave 
meaning to one‘s life and, also, from other people. Pain, typically, impacts on the subject‘s 
perception, thinking and action. To be in pain implies that one‘s world has been transformed.  
 
There may also be reasons to add one more case case. In this case, the subject cannot 
concentrate on anything else than the body- in-pain. I suggest that this is the case of pain that 
Emanuel Levinas (2005, p. 238) talks about when he says that severe forms of suffering 
subjugate the self, fully. The acuity of this suffering lies in the ―impossibility of retreat‖. This 
pain can be impossible to express in words: it not only ―resists‖ but ―destroys‖ language 
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(Scarry 1985, p. 4). All that it is possible to articulate is the groan and the cry. The self 
―becomes‖ pain (Bullington 2009, p. 106); the subject experiences that the hurt body is 
―swelling to fill the entire universe‖ (Scarry 1985, p. 35). This negative bodily awareness 
absorbs the subject‘s whole being. Scarry holds that intense pain annihilates objects of 
complex thought and emotion.There is a qualitative difference between pain that I am pre-
reflectively and reflectively aware of but which does not subjugate the self, fully and pain that 
does. 
 
Alienation implies that the body (that I am) appear as other and strange to me. Leder suggests 
that this is a possible (but not necessary) consequence of the body becoming an object of 
experience. The body, which previously has been that from which I direct my attention to 
others and the world, now becomes that to which I attend. Perception introduces an element 
of distance. I no longer experience that I am my body, but that I have a body.  
 
It is hard to imagine the person so twisted as to discover beauty in pain. Not even Marquis de 
Sade travelled so far in his own peculiar warp as to find pain beautiful. Three instances of 
change seem to me particularly useful for exploring the strange link between pain and beauty. 
These moments I will call the classical, the sentimental, and the postmodern. The term 
―moments‖ frees us from endless wrangling about the definition of historical periods and 
cultural movements. I mean simply that art at a specific time represents pain in ways that help 
to challenge and to shape the values of the surrounding culture. The link between beauty and 
pain that these three moments illuminate is thus far from solely a matter of aesthetics. Beauty, 
after all, even though it has almost vanished as a serious topic in contemporary thought, still 
influences our behaviour in countless practical affairs of life. Even without knowing it, ideas 
of beauty hold a significant influence on the ways we come to experience pain (Morris, 1993, 
p. 199).  
 
Pain in my work denotes the often nonverbal experience of sensation as opposed to the cognized 
memory, analysis or naming of that sensation. It often makes confusing the transition from somatic 
experience to its analytic perception, like in the cases of hysteria, cancer and AIDS. My starting point 
is the working definition of pain proposed by the International Association for the Study of Pain 
(IASP): pain is ―an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with either actual or 
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potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage‖.1  According to the Association, two 
quite different kinds of pain exist. The first is termed nociceptive, responsive to physical stimuli, 
because of its direct link with noxious stimuli, or psychological because it is a key component of the 
body‘s normal defense mechanisms protecting the body from a potentially hostile external 
environment. This pain is associated with tissue damage orinflammation.  
The second is termed neuropathic and results from a lesion to the peripheral or central nervous 
system. This can disrupt the ability of the sensory nerves to transmit correct information to the 
thalamus, and hence the brain interprets painful stimuli even though there is no obvious or 
documented physiologic cause for the pain (Hadjistavropoulos and Craig, 2004). Many types of pain 
have been further specified in terms of origin, related nociceptors (pain detecting nerves) and response 
to medications. Acute pain is defined as fast and sharp short-term pain or pain with an easily 
identifiable cause. Chronic pain is medically defined as pain lasting six months or longer, often more 
difficult to treat than acute pain. Cutaneous pain is usually well-defined, localised pain of short 
duration, caused by injury to the skin or superficial tissues. Somatic pain originates from ligaments, 
tendons, bones, blood vessels, and even nerves themselves, producing a dull, poorly-localised pain of 
longer. Visceral pain originates from body organs and internal cavities and is extremely difficult to 
localise, it can be a referred pain, where the sensation is localised to an area completely unrelated to 
the site of injury. Phantom limb pain is the sensation of pain from a limb that one no longer has or 
from which one no longer gets physical signals. Nevertheless, the term ―pain‖ is generally used to 
define all sensations that hurt or are unpleasant, not only the transmission of noxious impulses: pain is 
always a ―subjective state‖ (in: Morris, 2000, p. 9).  
Freud (1961) was the first to interconnect physical and psychological pain at the intersection of the 
whole psychological reality of the subject – its dreams, subconscious, love and mind. Freud argued 
that organ pains and focused pain in general are the result of tangible representation processes, 
concentrating on one hurting place, which Freud called narcissistic cathexis (Thijs et al., 2005).
2
 In 
addition, Melzack‘s gate control theory (Melzack and Wall, 2003) also contributed greatly to the 
recognition of pain as saturated with the visible or invisible imprint of specific human cultures. Gate 
control theory states that pain signals are filtered in the spinal cord by a ―gate‖ that opens and closes 
under the influence of different factors, i.e. hormones or the stimulation of nerves. This theory 
suggested that pain is not a direct result of activation of pain receptor neurons, but rather its perception 
                                                                 
1
Although this definition might seem formulated a while ago, it is still valid and can be found on the website of 
the International Association for the Study of Pain, even though other definitions have been re -evaluated in 
1994:  www.iasp-pain.org 
2
Particularly research on chronic pain and its psychological, social, and cultural components has fundamentally 
modified the definit ion of pain as a matter of nerves and tissue damage. 
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is modulated by interaction between different neurons. Therefore, a stimulus that activates only 
nonnociceptive nerves (such as rubbing a sore spot with one‘s hand) can inhibit pain. In response to 
this stimulation of the fast conducting touch nerves, the gating mechanism within the spinal cord 
would then close. The impact of this theory on medical treatment for pain has been profound. Pain and 
its acknowledgement have come to be seen as dependent on our personal characteristic – narratives, 
cultural background, feelings, and mood, often regardless of the tissue damage. That has had large 
consequences on my work.  
In my work I am using the terms ‗pain‘ and ‗suffering‘ alternately. Although the distinction between 
pain and suffering has consequence for ethics, for the purpose of this dissertation pain forms a concept 
embracing suffering, trauma and crisis. Cassell (1991) points out that pain and suffering are two 
distinct phenomena, claiming that suffering can often be relieved in the presence of continued pain by 
making the source of the pain known and exercising control over the experience. Suffering occurs 
when physical or psychological integrity is threatened. Conversely, he claims that people suffer when 
the pain is not particularly acute, when they anticipate it, are not sure about its origin or cannot gain 
control over it. Melzack and Wall (2003) also make a difference between those two terms. Suffering is 
defined as the negative reaction caused by pain, stress, loss and other psychological complaints. 
However, the progressing knowledge in psychology and neurology has blurred the differences 
between those two terms. I would argue that the split between pain and suffering reinforces the binary 
between body and mind, and employs the Myth of Two Pains, a basic belief that pain can be separated 
into physical and mental pain (Morris, 1991, p. 9). Particularly in the situation of making/looking at 
art, bodily pain enters an aesthetic and cultural dimension. Being the result of a biochemical process, 
the networking of nerve pathways and bodily reflexes, pain is at the same time a subjective experience 
formed by specific minds, senses and cultures. The obsoleteness of the split has been confirmed by 
recent medical developments: as brain- mapping studies show that pain centers and emotion-
processing regions often overlap there is practical impossibility to differentiate physical and emotiona l 
components of pain (Melzack and Wall, 2003). Sensory, cognitive and emotional processes all 
contribute to that one word, which in English has remarkably few synonyms.   
My assumption is that art could be a way to enable pain to enter wider shared discourse 
andconceptualization.
3
 When placed within a ―case study,‖ stories of illness and pain may gradually 
become devoid of meaning for those who live them, changed by a recipient‘s own experience. At the 
same time, art and literature offer an alternative to medical terminology for describing one‘s 
experience with illness. My intention is not only to show how pervasive of a presence pain is in artistic 
                                                                 
3
It is important to note that I do not consider art only as a group of components such as  production, 
criticis m,funding, iconographic and stylistic sources, exh ibitions et caetera (Pollock, 1988). Here and throughout 
all my research I see art as a social practice, as a compendium of power relat ions, ideological practices and social 
and cultural limitations. 
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discourse, but also to point out, since visibility is an imperative of contemporary social and cultural 
life, the ways in which pain is being made visible here. In addressing visual culture, my 
methodological assumption is that we can derive certain forms of knowledge on pain from visual 
images. The experience of pain is shaped by representations, simultaneously pushing against 
themselves. This antagony presents an enormous challenge to art. Vision and self knowledge are 
intertwined – the anxiety of pain and its impact on a viewer informs his/her sense of self. Art is to me 
the domain where that process is most vividly and played out on different levels. The works I present 
help me investigate how images of pain contribute to configurations of ―I‖. I also want to explore what 
those artworks might tell about the lived experience of pain and how it is communicated to a viewer. 
We not only feel pain, we also observe it. If work of art is a sign-producing activity unfolding itself 
within a social context (Bryson a & Balaban, 1991), than we have to read that sign as engaging our 
own positioning and reaction to it. Moving beyond the common cliché that pain is necessary to create 
art, my primary interest lies in how art practice could be making calls for a rethinking of the concept 
of pain. 
 
I.2. Pain and communication. Representing the unsharable 
It is frequently said that pain is incommunicable and even that it ―destroys language‖. This paragraph 
offers a phenomenological account of pain and then explores and critiques this view. It suggests not 
only that pain is communicable to an adequate degree for clinical purposes, but also that it is itself a 
form of communication through which the person in pain appeals to the empathy and ethical goodness 
of the clinician. To explain this latter idea and its ethical implications, reference is made to the 
writings of Emmanuel Levinas.Perhaps one of the causes for this approach is that pain is thought of as 
not directly communicable. As a result, clinicians must use an objectifying diagnostic form of 
judgement in relation to it and the treatments that they prescribe are based only upon such judgement 
rather than upon the communication of pain on the part of the patient. 
Pain is defined as ―an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential 
tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage. What this definition highlights is firstly the 
unpleasantness of pain. It goes without saying that, standardly, pain is something we would rather be 
without. The second most obvious point that this definition highlights is that pain is an experience. It 
makes no sense to say that a person is in pain but that he does not feel it. A person may suffer an 
injury or a malady of a kind that typically causes pain but, unless they feel it, they are not in pain. 
Thirdly, this definition points to the body. Pain is an experience that is felt in the body and, indeed, 
usually in specific organs or regions of the body. Even though there are cases such as those of 
phantom limbs or of psychogenesis, where pain is felt in the absence of any bodily lesion, pain is 
always felt as if it were located in a specifiable portion of the body. This point is important in that it 
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allows us to distinguish pain from other forms of suffering. The grief that one might feel at the loss of 
a loved one or at some other kind of disappointment, the fear that one might feel at the thought that 
one might be suffering from a disease, or the depression that one might feel at the thought that one‘s 
illness has rendered one‘s projects meaningless, are sometimes described as pain, but they do not fall 
under the official definition. They are emotions and forms of suffering, but they do not have that 
essential reference to the body which the definition of pain points to. Nor do they have that 
phenomenological quality of physical hurt which is definitive of pain. This is not to deny that such 
forms of emotional or spiritual distress may be accompanied by, or cause, visceral forms of 
discomfort, but such a bodily state should be thought of as pain separately from the grief, fear, or 
depression that may be causing it. And pain is, lastly, an emotional experience because of our negative 
reaction to it. It hurts and we want to be rid of it. Even if we had a theory about pain which allowed us 
to accept it intellectually, as when we call to mind the evolutionary advantage of being able to feel 
pain, or understand pain to be a warning of something gone wrong in the body, or when we consider 
pain to be an acceptable part of God‘s plan for humanity, we still feel it in its immediacy as 
unpleasant. To overcome this feeling and to accept it or even feel blessed because of it requires that 
one objectifies the pain to some degree. It requires that one ask what the merits of pain as such, or of a 
pain such as mine, might be. It requires that I place a little distance between myself and my pain so as 
to frame it in an intellectual construct.  
Pain is a hurtful mode of subjectivity; a way of being which is distorted, tortured, and distressed. Pain 
is a form of suffering. It is inherently unpleasant. Like other forms of suffering, pain leads its bearers 
to powerlessness, alienation, loss of control, and anomie, and the withdrawal of the self into itself.  
Relief and comfort will therefore comprise, not only alleviation of the pain, but also the empowerment 
of the patient, their enlivenment, their re-engagement with the world, and the re-establishing of 
communication and rapport with others. As a mode of subjectivity pain is intensely private. As a mode 
of subjectivity my pain is radically my own. There exists no objectification of it that would a llow 
another to share my pain.  
If pain were as intensely private as I have just suggested, therefore, how can it be an operative and 
salient feature of a clinical situation for a clinician to respond to? The idea that pain is intensely 
private and non-communicable would seem to suggest that nothing can be done to overcome the 
isolation that severe pain forces upon its sufferers and that there is nothing communicable for a 
responsible clinician to respond to with caring. An observation frequently made about pain is that it is 
incommunicable. These sentences from Virginia Woolf are often quoted: ―English which can express 
the thoughts of Hamlet and the tragedy of Lear has no words for the shiver or the headache . . . The 
merest schoolgirl when she falls in love has Shakespeare or Keats to speak her mind for her, but let a 
sufferer try to describe a pain in his head to a doctor and language at once runs dry‖ (Autton, 1986, p. 
2). It is suggested that the words that we do use to describe pain: words like throbbing, piercing, 
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persistent, stabbing, and so forth, are clumsy at best. They are metaphors and do not carry literal 
meaning. 
It is also said that such descriptions are not as helpful towards the clear delineation of symptoms and 
the making of diagnoses as are the visible or otherwise detectible lesions found in the body. After she 
notes that pain is frequently described with metaphors, the claim that pain is essentially 
incommunicable is expressed by Irena Madjar in this way: ―Thus, because bodily pain resists 
objectification in language, it is marked by a strong element of unshareability. In other words, pain 
silences and actively destroys language‖ (Madjar, 1997, p. 48). This seems to me to overstate the case. 
Firstly, there is nothing unusual about experiences having to be described in metaphors. Try describing 
the beauty of a sunset without using them. That one needs metaphors here does not imply that the 
experience is radically private, incommunicable, or unshareable. Secondly, all experience is inherently 
unshareable in some sense. It is in the nature of experience, being subjective, that it is the experience 
only of the experiencer. As such it is not shareable. It cannot be another‘s experience. You cannot 
make another feel a pain by talking about it. But this is both obvious and uninteresting.  
Virginia Woolf may be right in suggesting that our repertoire of words is relatively poor for 
communicating pain, but this just shows why we need a range of metaphors. Indeed, we often use 
them quite successfully. It is noteworthy that attempts have been made to systematise the descriptors 
of pain into a more coherent symptomology. The McGill Pain Questionnaire developed by Melzack 
and Torgerson (Smith, 1998) explored the connotations, relationships, contrasts, and similarities 
between the metaphors used in describing pain and their relation to actual maladies. But what does it 
mean to say that pain can destroy language? Elaine Scarry has argued this point with reference to such 
extreme situations as torture and war (Scarry, 1985). 
There are a number of philosophical reasons for the difficulties that attend the communication of pain. 
The first of these is that pain is not ―intentional‖. What this technical philosophical term means is that 
it is not about anything and does not refer to anything aside from itself. Other subjective states of 
persons are not like this. When I am angry, I am angry about something. When I feel fear there is an 
object or an imagined object that I am afraid of. What my pain does is draw attention to itself. It comes 
to preoccupy me in direct proportion to its severity. It is not a way of apprehending the world, but a 
mute and brutal presence that pushes all other subjective states, and the world itself, to the periphery 
of my attention. The consequence of this for our problem is that pain becomes hard to describe. I can 
describe my anger by saying what it was that annoyed me. I can describe my fear by saying what I was 
afraid of. But I cannot describe my pain in this way. I can refer to that part of my body in which the 
pain is located, of course, but this is not identifying an intentional object of pain so much as its locus. 
The ways in which I can describe my pain in language (as opposed to expressing it in gestures) is 
certainly limited by this feature. Another technical argument, and one offered by Scarry, is that pain 
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defeats language because the primary function of language is to refer to objects. When I say ―hat‖ in 
an appropriate context, I can be taken to be referring to a hat, whether a particular hat present in that 
context, or the more general idea of a hat. 
It is then suggested that pain is not an object in the world in this way and so is not an object that words 
can refer to. Now, if this argument were sound, then it would not be possible to speak about any of our 
inner, subjective states. What am I referring to when I say that I am happy or that Mary is happy? 
Without going into the technicalities of linguistic philosophy it might be enough to say that even in the 
absence of worldly objects to refer to, language requires objective criteria for the ascription of such 
terms. I can call Mary happy on the basis of seeing how she behaves. If she were crying at the time, 
my description can be deemed to be wrong. Similarly, I can call myself happy when I notice myself 
behaving in certain ways as well as experiencing certain feelings.  
It is the burden of Wittgenstein‘s so-called ―private language argument‖ that I cannot attribute inner 
states to myself solely on the basis of my own experience of those states. I cannot have learnt what the 
word ―happy‖ means just by noting my own internal states. How do I know that the state I am 
experiencing is the state that our language designates as ―happiness‖? By seeing that my expressions 
of that state are similar to the expressions that others evince when they are standardly described as 
happy. 
And so it is with pain. Certainly the experience is irreducibly subjective. My pain is radically my own. 
But how do I learn to call it pain? I do so by noting that the way in which the term ―pain‖ is used in 
the public domain is in order to describe a person who is grimacing, holding his mouth and making a 
dental appointment, or a person who has suffered an injury to his leg and is hobbling to a surgery for 
treatment. When such persons say they are in pain, they are not only expressing their inner state, they 
are also, in effect, teaching me what the word ―pain‖ means. I will then be able to use the term to 
describe my own inner states when I suffer such or similar injuries, engage in similar behaviours, and 
experience hurtful sensations. And having learnt it, I can use the term to describe similar inner states 
of mine which arise in differing contexts. In this way language can refer to pain, even though pain is 
not an object in the world. But a further function of language is to express our selves in an 
intersubjective world. Most of the times, our communication is purposeless. It is an expression of 
sociability and of our need for community. Perhaps the thought that pain destroys language means that 
it destroys such sociability.One effect of pain that is relevant here is that pain isolates. Pain presses its 
victims back from the world into a preoccupation with the state of their bodies, and in so doing it 
isolates persons from the world and from others. Despite what I have been saying about the 
communicability of pain, it remains true that it moves the boundary between subjectivity and the 
world inwards. 
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But persons in pain withdraw into themselves. For them, in proportion to the severity of their pain, 
their world reduces to their own isolated reality. The world ceases to engage such persons. They are 
not able to forget themselves and be fully in the world. They are not able to throw themselves into 
relationships with those around them and partake of the common subjectivity characteristic of social 
existence. Their pain crowds out all other interests and commitments. Their attention is focused upon 
themselves. They are obsessed with the states of their own bodies. It is not just that their experience is 
their own or that it is unshareable. All subjective states are like that. It is not that they do not have the 
words to express or describe their pain as others have argued. It is that they are not able to escape the 
prison of self-involvement which their pain has created around them.There is no reality for them but 
their own suffering. There is no subjectivity present to them but the nagging and searing insistence of 
their own tortured and isolated subjectivity.The objective and intersubjective world which language 
establishes and refers to are no longer available to the patient in severe pain. Thus a new form of 
intersubjectivity needs to be established: namely, one grounded in empathy.  
The other person is always ―Other‖ in the radical sense that he or she cannot be appropriated by me in 
my understanding or perception. I cannot understand another person in the way that I can understand a 
motor car, for example. In the case of a motor car, even without too much mechanical knowledge, I 
can completely grasp what it is, what it is for, and how it stands in relation to me. I can put it into the 
category in which it belongs. I cannot do this with another person. Even a person whom I know well 
(indeed, especially a person whom I know well) will always be beyond my intellectual, emotional, or 
conceptual grasp. The Other is infinite and ungraspable.It follows from this, for Levinas, that the way 
in which I approach another person, my comportment and attitude towards them, is ethical in nature 
from the very first.The ethically proper comportment that I ought to adopt towards the Other is that of 
letting their mystery be. I must not appropriate or classify. I must leave space. I must be open to 
encounter. I must be prepared to be surprised. I must be generous in my comportment, accepting in my 
attitude, and caring in my approach. 
The point that I wish to draw from this is that, despite my arguments showing that pain is more 
communicable than many have claimed, there is still something important being expressed in the 
claim that pain is radically private and unshareable. Like so many other identity-constituting features 
of subjectivity, pain is a mystery to the one who observes it from the outside. It is part of the infinite 
and ungraspable nature of the ―Other‖.The theoretical reason for this is that, to me, your pain is not a 
phenomenon. It is not a percept. It is a modality of your subjectivity. It is a condition of your mystery, 
of your otherness, of yourinfinity. While you can convey much of it to me by the things you say, the 
metaphors you use, or the bodily or verbal gestures that you evince, it remains your pain. At the 
deepest levels of encounter, I cannot grasp it or classify it. Even if I compartmentalise it as part of a 
diagnosis or treatment regimen, I cannot take possession of it or make it mine. I must respect it as 
yours. The irony of the argument is that pain is indeed mysterious. Just as the subjectivity of the other 
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is mysterious, so that modality of their subjectivity which we call pain is mysterious.Pain amplifies 
and intensifies the interpersonal appeal that exists between people who engage in genuine encounter. It 
amplifies it because the need of the other is greater and more immediate and because the comportment 
of the clinician is one of caring and benevolent attention. It intensifies it because, along with the lure 
of mystery and infinity which each person presents to another in encounter, pain highlights the 
vulnerability and finitude of each one of us. 
Pain is one of the commonest symptoms reported to doctors yet ineffective communication is 
a continuing challenge and remains a barrier to adequate assessment, understanding and 
treatment (Kimberlin, 2004). Modern concepts of pain have moved from the elusive 
simplicity of a pathophysiologic lesion that represents the ‗seat‘ of a pain, towards a complex 
neural and cortical process that is now frequently thought to ‗explain‘ pain, including its 
cognitive and affective elements. With this has come the realisation that the physician's and 
surgeon's roles have moved from excision or complete cure, to management, palliation and 
enabling some healing of the self. As a result of this paradigm shift it is self evident that 
effective communication is essential for success, but surveys leave no room for complacency 
about how well this takes place in pain clinics (Kleinman, 1988). 
 
A chasm exists between the subjective experience of pain and its objective measurement on a 
wide variety of validated scales. Most measures are language based, such as the McGill 
Questionnaire and verbal rating scale, while verbal metaphors remain formulaic, offering the 
individual little opportunity to express how they feel, or to contextualise the symptoms within 
a personal narrative. Furthermore, a well-documented stasis exists in many pain consultations 
as a result of physicians and patients searching for different meanings denoted by symptoms 
and wishing to protect different agendas(Kenny, 2004). The physical, metaphoric and 
linguistic space in which pain consultations take place can therefore be fraught with a sense of 
impasse, albeit seldom explicitly acknowledged during the encounter, as many of the images 
made during the original project suggest, One solution may lie in finding a language with the 
capacity to explore a patient's experience of pain beyond the physiological, which could 
lessen the divide between the significance of the pain as experienced within the sufferer's 
social and psychological schema, and the scientific world of current medical understanding of 
chronic pain. Kleinman describes the capacity to achieve some integration ―between 
physiological, psychological and social meanings‖ as core to patient complaints (Kleinman, 
1988). 
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Could a visual representation of individual pain provide a bridge between the self and the 
other? Could photographs depicting the personal experience of pain validate the subjective 
experience of it, so avoiding the need to prove pain's existence, especially when there are no 
physical signs from it? Even in this digital age with our awareness of the ambivalence of the 
relationship between ‗photography‘ and ‗reality‘ we still ascribe an authenticity to that which 
is captured photographically, making it a particularly useful medium for recreating the reality 
of another. 
In 2001/02 visual artist and pain sufferer, Deborah Padfield, worked with pain specialist 
Charles Pither and chronic pain patients from St Thomas' Hospital in London to co-create 
photographic images of pain, as a means of eliciting a different type of verbal dialogue in 
hospital about pain(Padfield, 2003). Following reports by patients that the process and 
resulting images helped discussion of the nature and impact of pain on sufferers, a feasibility 
study was conducted to examine the effect of using pain images during consultations with 
unselected patients of pain clinics interested in participating in an evaluation. 
 
The social sciences have used photographs to help elicit narrative almost since their invention 
in the 19th century. Photographs have been seen as potentially revelatory in medicine ever 
since they were used in the 1850s by Dr Hugh Welch Diamond, (Leggat, 1999) the French 
neurologist Duchenne(Duchenne, 1976) and by Jean-Martin Charcot, in the context of 
diagnosing and representing a variety of neurological problems, content iously including 
hysteria (Huberman, 2003). But in the late 20th century this use gave way to forms of photo-
elicitation and phototherapy pioneered by artists, such as Jo Spence and Rosy Martin, who 
used the construction of photographs to revisit and transform past experiences, including 
illness experiences (Wang, 1996).  Jo Spence's work affirms the power of photography to 
return a sense of control to the patient-photographer over their illness and how that illness is 
represented to others. Versions of phototherapy have evolved since in various arenas of 
human suffering. Recent studies such as ―Photo-voice‖ a technique researched by Wang, 
involves participants in producing and analysing images themselves or collectively with 
another professional (Thouthenhoofd, 1998). Thoutenhoofd studied the use of photographs to 
explore deaf people's worlds, terming it ‗autophotography‘, and much research has been done 
into the usefulness of children's drawings for diagnosing pain; pain charts and scales being 
developed using pictures or numbers, to describe their pain and/or drawings of pain (Unruh, 
1983). However, the study reported here is the first study we know of in which photographs 
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have been used within pain consultations to help in understanding the subjective experience 
of pain, with a view to improving doctor-patient communication.  
A message that emerges from these results is that the resource appeared useful in a variety of 
ways. Arguably it is the photograph's potential to trigger memory and construct new and 
multiple realities for viewers that makes it an apposite medium in this sort of context. The 
writings of Barthes, (Barthes, 1993) Berger (Berger, 1989) and others highlight the 
relationships between photography and memory, photography and language, and conscious 
and unconscious experience (Scott, 1999). In this small study, we found that photographic 
images did appear to bring some elements of pain experience out of unconscious and into 
more conscious dialogue and control.  
 
The significance of images is highly individual but also influenced by gender, culture and 
religious viewpoints. It is in the collaborative process of discovering and dissecting these 
meanings that their significance to, and impact on, pain experience can emerge. Narrative 
meaning is mediated through language; and here language has itself been mediated through 
images. Negotiating between image and language affords status to both image and word and 
also to patient and clinician, encouraging a sharing of the roles of listener and speaker, 
helping to equalise the consulting space, but, first of all, helping to reconstruct the identity. 
 
When forming a working definition of representation for the purpose of this research, I was  often 
amazed by the contemporary transparency of the term. ―Representation,‖ re-circulating in a 
multiplicity of discourses, has been stretched for miles across cultural studies, art history, feminist 
theory and other disciplines. It has become, both in popular and in academic writing, a doxa, a 
naturalized assumption. Simultaneously, the multiplicity of discourses on the body (such as medicine, 
biology, demography, psychology, sociology, psychoanalysis, anthropology and art) has dislocated 
somehow the definition of representation of the body. 
 
I.3. The history of representation of pain in visual arts 
Not all art is about human suffering by any means; the arts celebrate the joy that life brings as much as 
they mourn the losses that mark it. Celebration and mourning are both part of human existence; they 
have found expression in song, dance, drama, visua l art and poetry since human beings have existed 
on this earth. Poiesis, the capacity to shape our experience through the imagination, must take account 
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of both dimensions of our lives. I will focus on the ways in which the art can come to terms with pain 
and human suffering.  
What is the art of suffering? Is poiesis capable of responding adequately to suffering? What forms 
must it develop to do so? Can suffering be represented? In what way? All experience resists 
representation, suffering perhaps most of all. How can we possibly find a way to represent the 
unrepresentable, to place an experience that overwhelms us into a delimited form? How, above all, to 
transform suffering into beauty since all art strives after beauty? We need to re-imagine suffering in 
order to understand the role that imagination plays in the experience of human suffering. In order to do 
so, we must deconstruct suffering to see how the concept blocks imagination and artistic 
transformation. But we cannot stop there- we must also look at successful ways of shaping traumatic 
experience imaginatively. We must explore the art of suffering.  
The art would lie in discovering how to avoid merely stiff, passive resistance and how to use pain as a 
medium for a fluid, creative artwork. The distance between accepting pain and seeking pain is 
immense. Our view of art and artists still remains powerfully haunted by such portraits of self-
mutilation as the bandaged Van Gogh. European Romanticism beginning in the la eighteen century 
made pain seem indispensable to the artist- a tormented, unworldly spirit tightrope-walking over the 
abyss- and such self-portraits in pain may prove irresistibly seductive to an artist who suffers great 
hardships.     
Along the history there was made a clear distinction between mental and physical pain. While writing 
this thesis I was asked several time what kind of pain I 
am approaching. Let‘s consider the painting ―Anguish‖ 
by George Dergalis. Is such anguish- suffering so vividly 
embodied- really best understood as ―mental‖ pain? 
Does it make sense to say that the physical pain of 
headache remains completely separate from the mental 
pain of anguish? It is always possible, of course, to argue 
that the painter George Dergalis, trapped like all of us in 
the inadequacies of language, has given his work a 
misleading title. My approach however is to assume that 
we can learn much by exploring the insights that artists 
bring to the experience of pain. The painting of Dergalis, 
I think, encourages us to question the adequacy of an 
understanding of pain that separates mind from body.  
 
George Dergalis: Anguis 
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In the history of Western Art, one antique sculpture furnishes us with the prototypical icon of 
human agony.  Since its unearthing in 1506, from a property near the church of Santa Maria 
Maggiore in Rome, the Laocoon, or ―Laocoon Group‖, has been an object of sustained if 
variable attention. Yet even those who remain nowadays unmoved by the sight of the Trojan 
priest Laocoon writhing against the serpents sent to punish him and his sons must 
acknowledge this statue‘s prime historical importance as a focus of discussion about the 
aesthetics of pain. There is no doubt that the carving of Laocoon is intended to delineate a 
body taken to the extremes of  pain, though it took a biologist to point out that the 
corrugations of Laocoon‘s brow are exaggerated beyond anatomical accuracy. But such 
sculptural license is beside the point; and, for my present purposes, the noise implicit from 
Laocoon‘s straining features does not really matter.  
No one ever seems to have 
considered the question: wether 
the sculptors of the Laocoon 
intended their work to be a 
masterpiece illustrating the 
deepest pathos of the sublimest 
character in the contemplation 
of the human mind. The ancient 
Greeks hold no exclusive rights 
to tragic sensibility. That would 
seem a truism too obvious to 
state. Yet how can we 
demonstrate the force of it in 
cultures that have left no 
literature to match the preserved record of Greek tragedy?  
 
We can trust the language of images alone, we should credit the Egyptians with having at 
least afforded the occasions and the space for the external manners of lament. The tomb at 
Amarna thought to be that of Princess Meketaten, daughter of Akenhaten and Nefertiti, once 
presented a painted index of these expressions of grief: Meketaten seems to have died  while 
giving birth, herself perhaps only ten or eleven years old; and when the pharaoh deeply wept, 
his grief was contagious. Those tomb-paintings are cracked and broken now. But there is 
The Laocoon Group. Possible dates for the making of 
this sculpture range from the second century BC to the 
first century AD.  
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plentiful evidence in Egyptian art generally to show outbursts of sadness put into clichés of 
desolation. 
 
 Figures kneeling beseeching, falling faint, head-slapping, hair awry- these may fairly be 
taken to be pictographs of tragic 
gesticulation. In all the Egyptian 
imagery of grief, however, there is no 
effort on any artist‘s part to render the 
face as distorted by pain. The quest 
for naturalism in depicting human 
emotions was famously an enterprise 
of Classical artists. And the Laocoon 
statue traditionally stands at the end of 
this enterprise like some non plus 
ultra, or stylistic finishing line.  
 
So, it is a difficult task to trace the 
Laocoon‘s antecedences. Is it possible 
to establish any sort of aesthetic decorum in 
antiquity for the graphic representation of pain? 
And a task within this task is to avoid retrospective 
attribution to the ancients of intuitive tenets of 
Christian faith. In the early Middle Ages, the poet 
Dante, unable to contemplate Socrates amongst the 
damned, recruited honorary Christians from he 
schools of Athens; and during the Second World 
War, Simone Weil, while witness to the German 
occupation of Paris, constructed a reading of 
Homer which virtually incorporated him as a 
Messianic prophet. But the starting premise must 
be that for all the inklings of pity we find manifest 
in Classical thinking and literature, the essence of 
Christian belief is not there. In believers‘ eyes, 
Lamenting Women, from the Egyptian tomb of 
Ramose. Scene excerpted from the papyrus of a 
scribe called Ani, in the ―Theban Book of the 
Dead‖, 19th Dynasty (c. 1250 BC) 
Marsyas Suspended for Flaying  
Copy from a group originally made 
in the mid-third century BC.   
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Christ died for the world, so Christians translate by faith the extremity of passive suffering 
into sublime victory. Nothing in Classical antiquity remotely foreshadows that grace. To 
appreciate the gap one has the two myths where mortals are severely dealt with: the twelve 
children of Niobids, shot down with arrows because their mother had boasted her fecundity to 
the gods; or the satyr Marsyas, stripped of his flesh as the penalty for challenging Apollo on 
the pipes. The Niobids are not the multiple precursors of the Christian martyr St. Sebastian: 
their mother had slighted deities whose response was rapid and predictable. The satyr-piper 
Marsya did not blaze a path for St. Bartholomew, he was flayed alive to punish vanity and his 
slow agony redeemed no one.  
 
Agreeing on this basic premise- that the Suffering Servant has absolutely no claim to honour 
in any of the moral systems devised by 
the Greeks and Romans- we may proceed 
to acknowledge Classical Greece as the 
birthplace of the Western literary genre 
we call ―tragedy‖. The story of Laocoon 
belongs to the epic of the fall of Troy and 
few would dissent from George Steiner‘s 
salute to Homer‘s telling of that story as 
the primer of tragic art (Steiner, 1961). It 
is also accepted that the development of 
tragic drama in Classical Greece was an 
important prompt to expressionism in the 
figurative art of the time. Wounds and 
death and anguish are tragedy‘s flags. 
Characters on stage gesticulate and howl: if the actors do it well and the tragedy works its 
proper effect (which the Greeks termed catharsis or ―purging‖), then the audience should 
howl along too. But two particular restrictions upon the theatrical presentation of suffering in 
ancient Greece should be noted: the first is that the conventions of Classical Athe nian tragedy 
favored the carriage of violence by words; the second restriction may go some way to 
unpicking the conundrum of why tragedy should give pleasure or serve as entertainment. In 
fact, for the Greeks, tragedy did not necessarily yield the satisfaction of catharsis- that douche 
of emotions for the maintenance of sanity.  
 
The Sack of Troy 
Details of a red figured vase attributed to the 
Kleophrades Painter, c. 480 BC.  
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Perhaps the playwright‘s mistake here was not to mythologize contemporary events. About a 
decade later, a humble Athenian vase-painter produced his own little vignette of Troy‘s 
seizure, conceivably making an epitome or parable of what Simone Weil described as ―the 
greatest of grieves that can come among men: the destruction of a city‖ (Weil, 1987, 24-55). 
On the shoulder of a vase made to carry water, the painter packs as much dramatic details as 
the field of illustration permits. Trojan defenders are dying on the floor. Half naked before her 
rape, the princess Cassandra clutches at an idol for sanctuary. Hector‘s widow Andromache 
picks up a kitchen implement and joins the fray; while old Priam on his throne is being 
hacked about. His bald head seeps blood, and on his lap is the mutilated poppet-body of his 
grandson Astyanax.  
 
Pathos is conjured here- the palm tree wilts over the woman weeping below and even the 
godforsakeness too. This painted vase comes at a juncture of the naturalistic development of 
Greek art when there is yet none of the incarnate physical and physiognomical expressiveness 
that would appear in the Laocoon the statue. A gestural language of pain and doom is there  in 
the vase scene: three figures clutch their heads to protect the implore, but facial muscles are 
not apparently exerted. Ignoring the question of what an artist was technically able to produce 
at this time, we may wonder: was this the consequence of artistic self-restraint? 
 
Around 400 BC a Greek painter called Timanthes 
attempted to depict the story of the sacrifice of 
Iphigeneia.  Human sacrifice was not a custom of 
Greek religion, so it required some imaginative effort 
to reconstruct the scenario whereby Agamemnon, 
having boasted his prowess at hunting and thereby 
offended Artemis, was required to make amends with 
the goddess by sacrificing his daughter Iphigeneia. In 
an unusual fit of clemency and nicely so for those 
who would compare this myth with the Old Testament 
story of Abraham and Isaac, Artemis relents at the last 
moment. There is no the picture to confirm, perhaps a 
faded replica only. Having shown his the familial 
bystanders at the sacrifice in grief and lament, 
Head of a Figure from the 
Temple of Athena Alea at Tegea 
Attributed to Skopas, c. 340 BC.  
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Timanthes had used up his entire repertoire for depicting sadness. When it came to painting 
the face of Agamemnon himself, the artist could only resort to veiled head. There is a rival 
story concerning the lengths to which Parrhasius, another Greek painter from the fourth 
century BC, was driven by the search for expressive realism in a picture of Prometheus, 
drastic lengths involving no less than the fatal torture of a studio model. But since the work of 
Timanthes and Parrhasius does not survive, it seems unfair to question how far artists might 
solicit engaged response, compassionate otherwise, by means of naturalistic depictions of 
pain.  
 
Nonetheless, scholars of Classical art have long been content to attribute a sense or motive of 
pathos to this or that artist, purely on the basis of appearances. Of the fourth century BC 
sculpture Skopas, for instance, we are told that he created a new heroic mode of reversed 
fortune for which the arched brows of his characteristic figures, however battered, convey 
intense but indeterminate pathos. Of the Laocoon and other groups, we are reassured that they 
are concerned not merely with heroism, but with heroic pain, suffering that ennobled.  
 
Plato, pursuing in the fourth century BC the philosophical ideas bequeathed to the intellectual 
community of Classical Athens by Socrates, recognized that artists, poets and dramatists alike 
preyed upon the human capacity for sympathy and encouraged its expression. For Plato, pity 
sullied reason. Pity for others fostered a penchant for self-pity, a weakness. Moreover, it was 
a gender- inclined sentiment: naturally embedded in the disposition of a woman, emasculating 
to the reason-guided male. This scorn for pity, or moral lordliness over pity‘s emotional 
origins, would stem naturally enough from Plato‘s admiration for the physical resistance 
displayed by his mentor Socrates: in the Symposium, the image given of Socrates on military 
service- standing in the snow unshod and for hours, immune from normal bodily pangs of 
hunger and pain-  foreshadows an ethic of self-mastery which makes pity an affront to the 
philosophic life. Plato‘s most important philosophical successor at Athens, Aristotle, was not 
only much more sympathetic to the aims of contemporary poets and artists, he was also 
intrigued to understand the nature of sympathy itself. In his Art of Rhetoric, Aristotle defined 
pity as a kind of pain excited by the sight of bad things, fatal or painful, befalling someone 
who does not deserve them. In his methodical way, he itemized a catalogue of occasions 
which may frequently turn pitiable, ranging from death and separation from loved ones to 
suffering physical deformity or disappointed expectations.  
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No pity for those who deserve their woes. Aristotle‘s reasoning was soundly echoed in the 
teachings of one of antiquity‘s most widely diffused philosophical disciplines, Stoicism. 
Stoicism originated about 300 BC and rapidly spread through the Greek world; it was further 
expounded in the Roman Empire and one Roman emperor, Marcus Aurelius himself, became 
an influential adherent. Pity, said 
the Stoics, is grief for someone 
who suffers undeservedly. Even 
then it was unwelcome. The 
Stoics sought the inner 
contentment which they called 
apatheia- freedom from 
emotion. Apathy was the Stoic‘s 
cherished state of wisdom. A 
Stoic adherent standing before 
the Laocoon statue may or may 
not have made the stylistic 
connection between Laocoon‘s tormented form and the twist ing, writhing figures of 
vanquished giants on the frieze of the Great 
Altar of Zeus at Pergamum. Philosophically, 
however, the similarly agonized bodily 
movements and facial contortions would be 
attributed to a shared rationale of deserved 
suffering. Laocoon‘s protestations amount to the 
histrionics of impiety. So too at Pergamum the 
giants who would challenge the divine order 
wear grimace-rippled masks of angry pain. Their 
corrugated brows alone bespeak villainy. For 
contrast, consider the faces of the Olympians as 
they sally against those reptilian giants. Serenity 
of expression is a feature that unites all the 
deities, however strenuously they are fighting.  
 
It follows to retrieve an iconographic curiosity 
Greek Deities Triumphant over Struggling Giants 
Detail of the frieze of the Great Altar of Zeus at 
Pergamum, c. 170 BC. 
The Crucifixion and Iconoclasts 
Illuminated manuscript page from the 
Khludov Psalter, mid-ninth century. 
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from the centuries of early Christianity. Why, when the literature of Christian Martyrdom was 
so adoringly descriptive of fleshy pain and the Hell-quenching conduits of blood, were images 
of martyrs so anodyne, so clean? Why, in particular, was the exemplary pain of Christ 
crucified never made explicit in this period? Literally so: difficult to see, difficult to imagine. 
Our familiarity with the Cross as a logo, with Christ Crucified as amulet or homely presence, 
clouds our capacity to comprehend the original abysmal horror of what Latin legal language 
deemed to be utmost punishment. Crucifixion was a punishment with a truly putrid reputation 
in the Roman world. It was death deserved by the most unworthy of all unworthies; it was 
death with grim humiliation, ignominy and abasement. Who on earth would want its souvenir 
or remembrance?  
 
The distress of artists and the aficionados of icons during the period of Iconoclasm has been 
documented well enough. We need merely observe here that for some while, the painters of 
Christian images risked forms of torture and persecution peculiarly consonant with the 
treatment of the martyrs in the Roman Empire. And when the iconophiles eventually 
prevailed, we may almost sense a new charge of graphic energy being levied as vengeance. 
While clerics and theologians wrangled over the control and codification of sacral images, the 
artists, as it were, stole a march upon them. Our attention may be drawn to a page in a ninth-
century manuscript known as the Khludov Psalter. We see Christ robed put spouting blood 
from the Cross and the ugly features of a soldier proffering the vinegar- loaded sponge. 
Adjacent are two known Iconoclasts, busy whitewashing a tondo icon of Christ. Their 
sponge-on-a-pole is dipped into a chalice of whitewash which plainly imitates the chalice of 
vinegar at the foot of the Cross. 
Antipathy towards images is 
thereby judged equivalent to the 
mockery of Christ in agony.  
 
Christ in agony. The Roman 
Christ whose image appeared 
within a century went bare- legged 
and genial. By the close of the first 
Christian millennium, Christ was 
otherwise envisaged. He was no 
Christ Crucified  
Mosaic in narthex of the Katholikon (main church) of 
the monastery of Hosios Loukas (Saint Luke), by 
Mount Helicon, Greece. Before 1038.  
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longer triumphantly Apolline. Around the year 1000, not far from Apollo‘s great oracular site 
of Delphi, the monastery of Saint Luke, was built and in its chapel narthex we find a new 
reckoning with the prospect of Christ Crucified. Here we are served with a body slung into 
the meander of collapse and invaded fivefold by open wounds. Here is a face creased with 
weariness and the pain-stalked surrender of life. Flanked symmetrically by Mary and John- 
two bystanders at once admiring but downcast-this monumental cross proposes a revisionary 
signal of Christian affirmation. This valediction from Saint Paul to the Galatians launched the 
authority for what we see on the walls of the monastery of Saint Luke: a fresh aesthetic of 
devotion. It may be that the developed liturgy of the eucharist was driving the message of 
Christ‘s sacrifice and therefore fostering more intensive remembrance of Christ‘s suffering 
for mankind. But Iconoclasm‘s disputes had cleared the way for a revived confidence in the 
power of images. It was the power not only to expose or mediate doctrine, but to produce a 
Second Nature: the artist‘s privilege of imitation or mimesis. Orthodoxy decreed that Christ 
was to be worshipped with the image, not in the image. But the professed vocation of 
imitating Christ Incarnate would soon require artists throughout Christendom to strive for 
mimetic fidelity in the image of Christ Crucified and seek, accordingly, to prompt the 
response of sheer grief.  
 
 
 
 
Rogier van der Weydn: Detail of 
the Virgin Supported by St John 
 
The Roettgen Pietà 
Middle Rhenish wooden sculpture, c. 
1300 
 
38 
 
In the same context, a frequent motif is that of Mater Dolorosa. Only a twentieth-century 
Surrealist would be so delinquent as to show Mary spanking her infant son. Medieval image-
makers accepted the histrionics of Mary‘s role as Mater Dolorosa without demur. Several 
Flemish painters, notably Jan van Eyck (c. 1395-1441), were so given to depicting the 
Madonna that they may be called Marian specialists, of those who showed Mary‘s grievous 
collapse at the foot of the cross, Rogier van der Weyden (c. 1399-1464) seems most 
extravagant in costume and gesture. Immaculately robed, his Mary will fall backwards in a 
faint, or fling herself to clutch at the cross, either way, she leaks globular tears.  
 
By the sixteenth century, when Michelangelo attempted several sculptural groups of 
mourning over the lifeless Christ, the formal image of a Pietà would be charged with 
eroticism, or, at least, suggest the logic that the sorrowful Virgin knows no masculine body 
save that of her dead son. A German limewood group made at the turn of the thirteenth to 
fourteenth centuries may reflect the expressive requirements of this moment as staged in 
popular Passion plays whose audience was everyman. Christ lies awkward there, like a knotty 
manikin. His mother‘s faceis pulled, appalled; her mouth squared in the wake of the 
intolerable. Mary has been characterized as alone of all her sex, but in the medieval fostering 
of Mary‘s image as Mater Dolorosa there is a strong sense that if Christian faith is anchored 
by the capacity to empathize with the suffering of Christ, then women are, as a gender, bet ter 
disposed to show that faith.  
 
The nineteenth-century Swiss artist Arnold 
Böcklin has tidied the Christ‘s body to a near-
immaculate state of repose and allowed a fuller 
swathe of drapery across the holy loins; more 
significantly- he has supplied the comfort of a 
howling attendant – Mary Magdalene, mourning 
as extravagantly as any music-hall heroine.  
 
Some fifteen drawings survive of the hours 
Rubens spent with the Laocoon. The painter took 
diverse angles of study from around the group. He 
returned to his native Antwerp, in Flanders, late in 
Rubens: The Descent from the Cross 
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1608, where he was soon commissioned to undertake two enormous local projects. First was a 
triple altar-piece for the church of St Walburga, for which Rubens produced a Raising of the 
Cross.  The Christ of Rubens departed from Flemish tradition: outstretched here was no 
spindly, slack-bellied ascetic, but a powerful alumnus of the Classical gymnasium. Then, in a 
similarly huge triptych painted for Antwerp cathedral, Rubens had this cumbersome 
champion hoisted down. At its heart this deposition from the cross by Rubens is no less 
Classically- inspired than Raphael‘s panel of a century past. Light beams on to and away from 
a central figure which has ceased to struggle, but which is caught, literally, in Laocoon‘s 
schematic pose. And, as if to heighten that figurative recall of the pathos formula, Rubens 
brings on a further member of the Laocoon Group. He shapes Nicodemus, descending ladder 
on the right-hand side of the composition, into the attitude of Laocoon‘s elder son.  
 
Understanding pain as a medium of visionary experience can help account for the almost 
loving recitation of gruesome martyrdoms so familiar from the lives of the Christian saints. 
Most of the martyrs passed through barbarous suffering. Such suffer ing, of course, holds an 
almost sanctified place in the process of sainthood as a test or trial of faith. Bodily torment 
thus assumes specific meaning as a sign that points to a realm of eternal truth beyond the 
perishable body. Yet we still have not explained 
why Saint Sebastian, instead of Saint Stephen or 
Saint Dorothy, seems to have held such a 
peculiar fascination for medieval and 
Renaissance painters. One reason for this appeal 
probably has less to do with visionary experience 
than with the link between pain and beauty.  
 
A famous painting by Guido Reni shows 
Sebastian enduring martyrdom with the 
sensuousness of a languid Greek god. 
Neoplatonic traditions might here encourage 
some viewers to understand physical beauty as 
the outward expression of a beautiful soul. 
Visionary pain sometimes contains a powerful 
element of sensuality, and an eroticism latent in 
the paintings of Saint Sebastian finds more open expression in the spiritual experience of 
Guido Reni: Saint Sebastian 
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female mystics. Arrows, of course, might come from Eros as easily as from Diocletian‘s 
archers. In fact, Guido Reni‘s Sebastian conveys the same mingled erotic and spiritual power 
that infuses Bernini‘s famous sculpture of another visionary figure in whom rapture and pain 
seem strangely united: Saint Teresa of Avila. Pain is a vital element in Teresa‘s devotional 
life. Indeed, we might consider her a female counterpart of Sebastian: arrows, pain, beauty, 
eroticism are inseparable. Teresa‘s erotic spirituality seems to grow in importance at the very 
moment when Sebastian‘s influence begins to wane.  
 
Bernini, the sculptor now acknowledged as captain of the Italian Baroque, was scarcely out of 
paternal apprenticeship when he fashioned the image of his holy namesake St Lawrence. It 
may have been a technical challenge: how could a sculptor show the flames of this 
martyrdom, which hitherto had been shown only in painting and mosaic? By any standards, 
let alone those ones might apply to a sculptor only sixteen years old, the result is impressive, 
and certainly true to the original narrative of the martyr‘s fate. Upon a solid but busily 
flickering gridiron, St Lawrence reclines on his left elbow as languidly as any Roman 
banqueter, with his head tipped back in voluptuous satisfaction. Torturers require noise for 
their gratification, but this is the victim who thwarts them of an ambience shrill with shrieks 
of pain. True ardour and a carved attitude of rapture that is what Bernini would refine but not 
alter throughout his subsequent career. The tipped-back head, the pinioned legs and arms of 
the marble statue- again it is hard to exclude Laocoon‘s influence here.  
 
Bernini, in order to apprehend 
the effect that the fire should 
have e flesh and the agony of 
martyrdom on the face of the 
saint, placed himself with his 
bare leg and thigh against a 
lighted brazier and recorded the 
result using a mirror. This 
seems like a measure of the 
sculptor‘s devotion to his 
métier, not an explanation of appearances. But what constitutes ―realism‖ here? Those 
moderns who cannot look upon Bernini‘s work without glimpsing the physical insignia of 
sexual bliss, underestimate the tenor of Counter-Reformation creeds. Bernini and his 
The Martyrdom of St Lawrence 
Bernini, 1614-15 
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contemporaries knew very well what lay behind St Teresa‘s transverberation. It was the result 
not of a male sexual prowess, but Teresa‘s own struggle to climb the ladder of ascent, the four 
stages of prayer that end in utter surrender to God.  
 
The interest for anatomy and for representing everything in anatomical detail, resuscitated in 
the nineteenth century. One example is Géricault. He had been in Rome and had studied the 
monumentalism of bodies by Michelangelo. He went along to the Beaujon hospital in Paris, to 
contemplate bodies in states of wasting and decay. He went further: visitors to the large studio 
hired by Géricault for the sake of the massive composition of his work ―The Raft of the 
Medusa‖ found that the artist was acquiring body parts of criminals decapitated by the 
guillotine and keeping them about his premises. It was a well established rule for painters 
submitting historical subjects to the critical scrutiny of the annual Paris exhibition or Salo n 
that the many components of such paintings be individually accurate and studied. However 
grandiose the theme and overall vision, its details must show an artist‘s diligent hours of 
preparation. So Géricault‘s studio doubled as a temporary morgue. The bits and pieces he had 
to live with were the rotting dead.  
 
When not used for rest or pleasure, a bed is synonymous with serious illness. So it is that the 
size of the hospital is measured on the basis of the number of beds they contain; including 
other objects that are transformed into stand- ins, designed for medical activities. Even the 
clinic itself, understood as a place for 
the diagnostic examination of illness, 
takes its name from the Greek klinē, 
meaning ―bed‖; thus ‖clinical‖ has its 
roots in klinikos, meaning ―of the 
bed‖. The themes of illness, death and 
the end of existence are subjects 
treated with great importance by 
artists. The works in question are 
often reconstructions of scenes from 
literature or historical events, but 
there are also paintings that have the 
value of private meditation or a Rembrandt: Sick oman in Bed 
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simple homage; works meant to serve as companions during the long, silent hours of illness, 
such as the drawing by Rembrandt of his wife, Saskia. The realistic description of the 
isolation and impotence experienced by an invalid assumes decidedly more dramatic tones in 
the works of twentieth-century artists. The details present a cruel vision of reality, and the 
sick person is shown abandoned to him- or herself. Illness seems to have won out over even 
suffering itself, leaving no space for a companion, let alone someone to stay with the sick 
person and await a reawakening.  
 
Rembrandt makes skillful use of black, suggesting by means of dark shadows a sense of 
precariousness and dramatic premonition that infuses the entire composition. The artist does 
not merely depict reality, but expresses with extraordinary awareness the sick‘s woman 
suffering and sorrow, communicated through the position of her body and the expression of 
her face.  
 
The woman portrayed is probably Rembrandt‘s wife, Saskia, whose health was seriously 
imperiled by a series of pregnancies, beginning in 1635- the year after their marriage with the 
birth of a baby that soon died (Bordin, 2010, p. 48). There were two more births of children 
who died prematurely and finally, in 1641the birth of Titus, the only child to reach adulthood. 
The following year Saskia died.  
 
A similar topic is represented in the work of Angelo Morbelli ―The Sick Daughter‖. A flicker 
of light entering the room 
through the window suggests 
that the mother, watching 
over her sick daughter has 
been at her vigil for a long 
time. The presence of the 
woman is certainly a sign of  
the companionship that can 
break the isolation of illness. 
The painting technique of 
Divisionism (similar to 
Pointillism), which Morbelli 
had used since the 1880s, allowed him to modulate the light, moving beyond mere naturalistic 
Rembrandt: Sick Woman in a Bed 
Angelo Morbelli: The Sick Daughter 
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description and illuminating the simple interior with a sense of hope. The artist‘s language, 
full of subdued, but authentic intimacy, suggests intense emotion, while the slow entry of 
light becomes a sign of acceptance 
of the truth of all existence. In a 
sort of funeral diary, the Swiss 
symbolist artist Ferdinand Hodler 
recounted the slow death of his 
companion, consumed by a tumor 
(―The Sick Valentine Godé-
Darel‖). Understandable 
exhaustion seems to make the 
woman‘s head heavy, and she has 
troubles keeping her eyes open; her 
face expresses unspeakable 
suffering, while the presence on the right of a clock on the wall and flowers increases the 
sense of transience and the imminent end of life. Against the pale glow of the surface of the 
page , the outline of the image becomes a disturbing presence, permitting the viewer to move 
from exterior to interior reality. The spectral appearance of the woman symbolically translates 
her body, and the extreme stage of a disease becomes iconic of existential anxiety.  
 
The work ―Operated On‖ presents with intense realism, in minute detail every individual 
element of the mechanical devices attached to this patient in intensive care: tubes for assisted 
breathing and the collection 
of urine, the cables of an 
electrocardiogram, and a 
needle for infusions. Even 
the cloth placed on the man‘s 
forehead to help lower his 
body temperature becomes 
an anonymous bandage, but 
one that does not imply the 
attentive presence of a 
caregiver close at hand.   
Ferdinand Hodler: The Sick Valentine Godé- Darel 
Antonio López García: Operated On 
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The immobility of the scene is such that the man himself seems to have lost the warmth of life 
and is transformed into a mannequin with a sheet that covers his legs, the only part of his 
body that is not involved at the moment in any medical treatment.  
 
For an artist self-portrait is the opportunity to 
give an account on the self and his or her art, 
laying bare a psychological state and 
communicating what cannot be said with words. 
In the psychiatric hospital at Saint-Rémy, Van 
Gogh had the use of two rooms, one in which to 
sleep, another for his work. In this solitude he 
painted works of extraordinary intensity and 
torment energy, including ―Starry Night‖, in 
which the cosmic swirling of brushstrokes 
constitutes a dramatic backdrop for the deeply 
felt ―Self-Portrait, September 1889‖, painted on 
the day after another crisis of the painter‘s 
illness. Van Gogh‘s dramatically intense 
expression leads into the depths of his awareness 
and he wrote that it was in ―learning to suffer without complaining, learning to consider pain 
without repugnance, that one risks vertigo.‖ He risked his life to show how fragile our 
existence is and communicated in the only way possible for an artist by making his paintings 
speak. Time and again, artistic sensitivity proves itself capable of investigating, with creative 
brilliance, the experience of illness and even the pitiless progress of the decay of old age.  
 
Each of Van Gogh‘s self-portrait is different, a not only in terms of setting, but in terms of 
dramatic intensity, and thus each is unique in terms of specific chromatic relationships and the 
meanings signified by his brushstrokes. In the self-portrait of September 1889, swirling 
brushstokes in cold tones cut into the surface and create a sense of flow, dominated by an 
internal energy.  
 
Vincent Van Gogh: Self-Portrait, 
September 1889 
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―Self-Portrait with Bandaged Ear, 1889‖ was made after overcoming the crisis that had led 
the artist to cut off his earlobe,  and the use of color reveals a rediscovered serenity. The 
Japanese print and the easel suggests his desire to return to painting and thus to his life.  
The image of a sick person has of his or herself 
can include not only the disease, but also the 
healer. This painting plays on a contrast between 
the wasted figure of the delirious painter, 
suffering nightmares that materialize in the 
background and the tireless physician who, like a 
true Good Samaritan, supports and cares for his 
friend.  
 
 To the sick person nothing seems to exist 
beyond his or her own personal situation, and 
there is no separation between, on the one hand, 
the world of actual, objective reality and, on the 
other, the imaginary and the symbolic sphere. So 
it is that a work like this self-portrait that can be 
transformed into a sort of ex-voto made for the 
healing physician, who is seen as a savior. In fact, in 1820 Goya, then seventy-free years old, 
gave the work to his friend Dr. Arrieta to thank 
him for saving his life.  
 
The inventory started in 1839. Delacroix 
welcomed it. The box-camera devised by Henri 
Daguerre in 1839 was for Delacroix a boon to all 
painters. The daguerreotype was seen as a 
translator commissioned to initiate us further into 
the secrets of nature. It was an indiscriminate 
tool, inclusive to a fault. But it was of more 
benefit than threat to art. Others, most famously 
the poet and Salon critic Charles Baudelaire, in 
a ragging essay of 1859 denounced all the 
Vincent Van Gogh: Self-Portrait with 
Bandaged Ear 
Francisco de Goya: Self-Portrait with 
Dr. Arrieta 
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claims of photography to be art (Baudelaire, 1964).  
 
Art or not, there is a sense in which every photograph is forlorn. If photography compiles a 
visual list of everything in the world, it is always a passing permanence. When the lens falls 
such shut the flu goes on. For seconds, or fractions of second, we clutch at eternity. 
―Photographs state the innocence, the vulnerability of lives heading toward their own 
destruction‖ as Susan Sontag noted in her meditation On Photography (1977), and this ―link 
between photography and death haunts all photographs of people.‖ 
 
Beyond the plangency intrinsic to the medium, however there is the camera‘s claim upon 
verisimilitude. Géricault was not accurate in the number of bodies he put on the raft of the 
Medusa, and Delacroix never went to Chios, but both artists, in their way, intended some sort 
of documentary credibility in the scenes of disaster they portrayed. Goya let it be known by 
using the tag ―I saw this‖, those appraising the work of Géricault and Delacroix were overtly 
made aware that both artists had interviewed eye-witnesses to the events commemorated on 
canvas. Was photography the brusque new route to such conviction, the ultimate mechanistic 
on the claim ―I saw this‖?  
 
Most of us know what our forebears were less inclined to suspect that photographs can be 
staged, faked and otherwise distorted, that the medium carries no absolute assurance that it is 
safe for us to suspend disbelief. Still we are prone to accept that a photograph will expose 
truth with raw immediacy. So it is a curious fact that in the early days of photography on the 
first occasion that a camera was 
sent to war, it was to undertake 
a cover-up mission.  
 
Later on, the avant-garde 
painter represented the war, but 
that did include illustrating 
suffering. The Futurists stand 
close to the source of the 
modern understanding of the 
term ―avant-garde‖. In military 
C.R.W. Nevinson: La Patrie 
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usage avant-garde means the part of an army that goes on ahead, like an expeditionary force. 
All the many artistic statements and adventures that have subsequently   been labeled as 
avant-garde in this risk-taking, forerunning sense, none bear it so aptly as the Futurists. For 
the Futurists were not only prepared to make a metaphorical advance guard in seeking beauty 
from the industrialized world, they signed up for direct action. ―Nous voulons glorifier la 
guerre- seule hygiène du monde‖ insisted Marinetti in his salvo of 1909. Explaining the 
unrepetant Futurist eagerness for war and destruction is not so easy. Marinetti participated in 
both street fisticuffs and formal combat, he cannot be said to have enthused about bloodletting 
because he knew nothing of it. War is beautiful, stated the Futurists, because it creates the 
new architectural forms of big tanks, geometrical flight formations, smoke spirals from 
burning villages. They were not idly dreaming, nor teasing purely for the sake of mischief. So 
the mystery is: how could creative, intelligent, sensitive individuals commit themselves to 
such a credo? 
 
Artists around Europe joined the war. War, however, was not respectful of the alliances of art. 
―All a poet can do today is warn‖, a 
mottos which was Wilfred Owen‘s 
demure way of claiming for poetry 
no place of consolation, but, at least, 
the keen accuracy of open eyes. 
Christopher Nevinson, for his part 
very soon became convinced of the 
painter‘s equivalent urgency here: to 
warn, and above all inform. Is 
canvas of wounded man in the train 
of retreat is typical of his vision and 
revision of Futurism‘s splendid faith 
in guns. War- sole hygiene of the world? Warriors- steeped in the honour of acting on their 
stalwart masculinity?  
 
One of the officially directed British ―war artists‖ was Paul Nash. Nash was a landscapist; still 
he was frustrated by the prohibition laid upon him not to show any corpses, even when being 
faced with one huge grave. So Nash resorted to the device of the pathetic fallacy- the 
investment of inanimate scenery with human personality, sensibility. The pathetic fallacy was 
La Patrie 
Christopher Nevinson, 1916  
 
Paul Nash: We Are Making a New World 
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first recognized as a feature of Romanticism by Ruskin in 1856. In the artwork of Nash ―We 
Are Making a New World‖, there are no aircrafts, no tanks, no men, no scattered parts 
thereof, only earth‘s cold clay: pocked, crumpled and ridged, and sodden- as if with its own 
tears; only trees- amputated, gassed, stumpy, blown to nothingness. So, even without 
representing human bodies, Nash could suggest the human suffering.  
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IInd Chapter: Pain as personal experience  
II.1. Medicine and photography. The individualization of the sufferer 
Since the invention of the photography in the XIXth century, the social sciences broadly 
explored the benefits of this tool. Believing in its nature of capturing and immortalizing the 
truth, it was used as revelatory in medicine- in 1850 by Dr. Hugh Welch Diamond, by the 
French neurologist Duchenne, by Jean-Martin Charcot in the context of diagnosing and 
illustrating several neurological problems including hysteria. In the XXth century the 
importance of the photography is qualitatively improved from a mere tool that witness and 
document the reality, to a therapeutic process. Jo Spence and Rosy Martin pioneered the 
phototherapy allowing the sufferers to transform their experience of pain, to transpose it from 
a semantic register to another- where there is less control; confer them the power to control 
their illness and its representation to others. If pain is a social, then a personal construction, 
why not transforming it, using its potential and language for a greater experience, this would 
free the sufferers from the feeling of being condemned.  
The medium of photography in my view has very specific means of visualizing the painful 
experience of the body. In photography, the notion of objectification and externalization of 
pathological or malfunctioning organs and anatomical parts is often implied. Gilman (1993) 
stresses the collaboration between the educative function of photographic images and the 
aesthetic tradition of representing the mentally ill; in the nineteenth century photographs of 
the pathological (mad, criminal, prostitutes and freaks) were extremely popular and 
constituted a recognized source of knowledge. The notion of photographs as documents rather 
than art reflects the tension between the belief that photographic and filmic images function as 
epistemological tools to get to know reality and that the knowledge and documentary value of 
a photograph is determined not solely by notions of authenticity, correctness and truth 
(Crimp, 1980). Elkins (1999) argues that most contemporary medical imagery based on 
photography - positron-emission tomography (PET), computerized axial tomography (CAT) 
and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) - depicts the malfunctioning body as weightless and 
painless. 
The experience of the body in pain is a phenomenon that mainly defies attempts at visual 
representation. Beyond the obvious claim that an image can never unproblematically 
represent the complexity of a lived reality, the visceral experience of pain both animates and 
confounds attempts to ‗make sense‘ of pain within the logic of a culture and a politics that 
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rely for their ethical bearings on the verifiability associated with the visible. Despite the 
apparent disconnect between the ‗objective‘ visual and the ‗subjective‘ or experiential tactile, 
the image of the body in pain animates and makes possible a whole host of political activities, 
from torture to military intervention to anti-war activities to critical social science scholarship. 
It is not a facile process to adjudicate between the ethics of privileging such imagery on the 
basis of intentionality alone. Indeed, many of these practices rely on a techno- logic of the 
visual to validate their respective projects, and many rely on the circulation of abject imagery 
to illustrate and support their political claims. In turn, these practices fetishize pain in their 
drive to make visible what is essentially unimageable – that is, the spectrum of experience 
associated with the body in pain.  
 
The body in pain is thus produced as an aesthetic visual image, a symbolic icon that stands in 
for itself as the referent object of political violence. To say that pain is essentially 
unimageable, however, is not to say that it operates as an interiority that cannot be accessed or 
responded to.  
 
In 20001-2002 visual artist and pain sufferer Deborah Padfield, in collaboration with pain 
specialist Charles Pither realised a project in Saint Thomas‘ Hospital in London among the 
chronic pain patients. It consisted in making photographic images which would faithfully 
express the complexity of the experience of pain. The aim of the project was to make easier 
the dialogue between the patients and the health care professionals, especially for those 
sufferers who find difficult to articulate and explain verbally how they feel. Combined with 
the face to face dialogue, the photographs provided new, complementary, useful information, 
particularly about the emotional state of the patient; facilitated the identification of the origin, 
kind and nature of pain; it diminished the feelings of isolation; though not all images were 
relevant and with communicative value for the clinicians.  
If the arts might be considered as a means to express in a plastic way the human condition, 
then, the illness as being at the core of the human experience needs a legitimate space within 
arts.  The increasing number of the images of pain, disease in contemporary art highlights the 
continuous attempts in shaping and legitimizing a particular aesthetic of pain within the 
institutional discourse of the contemporary art practice. When referring to the term 
―discourse‖, I mean in foucauldian sense as a historical, social structure of categories and 
beliefs. So, I aim to decode the message of these works and the art disco urse behind that 
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defines them; as well as the political, social and ethical context in which they originate and 
circulate. As it is obvious, the matter of ethics and aesthetics are overlapping.  
In the history of representation of pain and illness, the med ical discourse had a crucial role 
providing a complex explanation. From Hieronymous Bosch‘s The Extraction of the Stone of 
Madness, to Albrecht Dürer‘s Melancholia I, to Rembrandt‘s The Anatomy Lesson of Dr Tulp  
we witness a constant invasion of the medical into the visual.   The process of the 
institutionalization of medicine was accompanied by the growing interest of the arts for the 
phenomenon of illness. The 19th century welcomed the birth of the clinic and, at the same 
time, the birth of photography, both supporting and completing each other, offering a broader 
understanding of the patient. The interactive relationship between medicine and art resulted in 
an aesthetic realism of the reality of pain. The commencement of this interaction can be 
identified in earlier stages of the institutionalization of both discourses- anatomy, 
physiognomy and the apparition of the idea of Public Health are interpreted with particular 
references to photography. This realism is deeply grounded on the modernism‘s fixation w ith 
―truth‖ and ―objectivity‖.  
In the 1970‘s occurs a turns against iconography  and a re-politicization of the artworld. Once 
with the increasing popularity and the wide influence of the psychoanalysis, the intersection 
between aesthetic and medical perspectives of seeing the afflicted generated new approaches.  
Michael Foucault‘s historical-philosophical accounts about the institutionalization of 
medicine constructed the narrative about the mechanism of ―natural‖ and ―social‖ man. 
Foucault‘s approach deciphers the ways in which life has been medicalised and 
institutionalized since the 19th century and identifies the medicine as one of the most 
important agents of exercise of disciplinary power on the human subject. According to 
Foucault, the birth of the clinic caused and facilitated the indivilualiazation of the sufferer; it 
conferred to pain and disease an organization, a structure and a space that permits 
visualization and categorization. The concept of ―individual patient‖ appeared due to the 
simultaneous birth of clinic and photography. Under the clinical gaze illness has been 
detected and configured; and the idea of seeing as a way of diagnosis gained prominence 
(Foucault, 2003).  
The sociologist Georges Didi-Huberman  states that the identification of pain by using the 
visible mode formulated ―the figurative problem that obsessed every medical clinic, the 
problem of the link between seeing and knowing, seeing and suffering‖ (Didi-Huberman, 
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2003). This phantasmatic link remained an unresolved structura l and political problem within 
the history of the representation of pain. The category of ―individual patient‖ as both subject 
and object for the clinical observation turned into a sensible space for political, ethical issues, 
especially after the 1970s when the representation of suffering started to bear new 
connotations. The political valences as well as the aesthetic one of the images of illness are 
still pertinent and require a holistic understanding. I try to clarify how artists and art 
institutions respond, perceive and represent the disease and what is the special frame of 
contemporary art comparing to other historical moments of the representation of the ill. The 
current paragraph of the thesis methodologically engages statements from Michael Foucault‘s 
account, medical sociology and cultural and feminist theories of the body.  
 Representing pain in the arts gives birth to a very specific discourse practice which relies on 
two main issues: on one hand, the figurative problem of pain as representation, and, on the 
other hand, the broader implications of this representational field for the wider domain of the 
politics of representations. Also, it makes evident two main questions: how the category of 
―individual patient‖ and its identity constitute the departure point of the representation of 
illness in the nowadays art; and how the aesthetic that promotes and defends a homophobic 
carnal perspective coexists with an aesthetic which aspires for recognition.  
The most representative case of the reaction of the art community to a topic of medical 
concern is that of the responses to AIDS syndrome. It provoked a new wave of cultural 
activism, contributed to the re-politicization of the artworld, it was a fertile time for the 
apparition of a new generation of female artists which used their bodies in representing their 
subjectivity thus giving new reverberations to the feminist work of the 1970s.  
The continuous interaction between the personal and the political since the 1980s aroused a 
quest for a decentered human subjectivity, a visually declared need of recognition 
aesthetically and politically shaped by representation of illness. Feminist artists used their 
bodies as a ―canvas‖ where identity is shaped and displayed. This generation of artists 
constructed a new vision about the wounded, the personal experience of being ill by 
challenging the medical and the political understanding of pain, disease, health and normalcy.  
The cultural critic and writer Douglas Crimp opens his work AIDS: Cultural 
Analysis/Cultural Activism with a highly disputed statement: ―I assert to begin with that 
―disease‖ does not exist‖ (Crimp, 2002). He underlines that representations configure as the 
locus of power and control, a space of creating and exercise of a certain ideology. Our 
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perception of health and illness, of pain and wellbeing is directly shaped and constantly 
influenced by our culture.  
Even if the World Health Organisation did not alter the definition of health elaborated in 
1948, medical sociologist affirm that the concept of health implies continuously fluid 
meanings according to the cultural, social and political changes; and the perception of disease 
is in constant adaptation.  Ultimately, the research aims not just to deconstruct what means to 
be ill, but also what means to be human. The images of disease are articulated on a subject, 
but the individual disappear, is just a support, the images of illness thus making isolated icons 
associated to the fear of collapse, of evanescence. At the same time, there is a tendency of 
―de- individuation‖ of diseases under a homogenizing power that incite to homop hobia. The 
politics of the representation of disease aim to stigmatize, to ostracize and control.  
Studies into the ways how people construct meaning in pain narratives indicate that aesthetic 
expressions of experiences may play an important role in meaning making and sharing. Pain, 
especially when it is provoked by illness, does not only influence a person‘s physical well-
being and psycho-social functioning, but also affects and permeates the way how we 
experience ourselves (Bury, 1982). Serious illness, especially chronic illness, transfers a 
patient into another life world with particular social roles, rules and identities (Kleinman, 
1988). How one feels and defines his or her identity depends on the recognition one receives 
in the interaction with others (Gergen, 1994). In this process the sufferer must find answers to 
questions: ‗Why me? What is the cause of my falling ill? How can I control the pain?‘ This 
involves coming to terms with experiences of loss, overcoming fear and anger and restoring 
self-confidence.   
 
Drawing inspiration from psychological tests that use ambiguous images and photos to make 
subjects project their own interpretation into the test material, photography is considered by 
some social scientists as a hermeneutical device (Hagedorn, 1996) that helps subjects to 
project meaning (Harper, 2002) from deeper layers of consciousness. In health care, Frith and 
Harcourt (Frank, 1998) used hermeneutic photography to capture women‘s experiences of 
chemotherapy for breast cancer. Keller et al. (Keller, 2008) used a hermeneutic method with 
photography to uncover contexts relevant for assessing dietary intake and physical activity in 
diverse ethnic groups. Oliffe and Bottorff (Oliffe, 2007) interviewed patients with prostate 
cancer on the photographs they had made about the experience of having cancer. Photography 
has also been used as a client-controlled instrument to improve quality of care (Royers, 2000).  
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Although these examples of photo- interviewing focused on clients‘ reflections on their lived 
experiences, this was not done for therapeutic reasons. Photo- interviewing was in the first 
place a research tool; the reflection was not sought for as an instrument of improving 
awareness for the sake of empowerment. Photo research remained descriptive; it did not serve 
as a vehicle for transforming social reality.  
 
Hermeneutic photography as a therapeutic instrument aims at facilitating persons to give 
meaning to their life world. Photographs enable humans to find meaning through visualizing 
and interpreting lived experience. Making photographs of situations in one‘s life may be seen 
to trigger a reflective process in which images become the carriers of symbolic and 
metaphoric associations, of which the photographer had no clear idea when taking his p ictures 
(Hagedorn, 1996). 
 
Since the 1990s, when the activists artists moved into a position of authority and their works 
became institutionalized and commodified in the art market, the image representing disease 
ceased to bear the same political connotation, becoming more self-reflective, more and more 
aestheticized and spectacularised. Medicine continue to invade arts and the artists constantly 
approach illness- from tuberculosis, to madness, cancer and AIDS.  
Pain is the most common symptom reported by patient to the doctor. The personal, subjective 
nature of pain makes its communication inexact and less efficient and thus it constitutes an 
obstacle in its understanding, assessment and treatment. Communicating pain involves more 
affective elements which turn difficult an objective measurement. The metaphoric and 
linguistic tools to contextualise the symptoms within a personal narrative are not explicit 
enough.  That is the reason why other non-verbal tools could improve the communication. 
One solution would consist in establishing a language which would integrate the 
physiological, psychological and social meanings of pain, accessible for the patient and for 
the scientific world of current medical understanding. Such a solution might be the visual 
representation of pain. It would be a medium to bridge the chasm between the self and the 
other. The question is: in which measure the photograph can transpose the personal, 
subjective experience of pain as an objective, universally understood proof of its existence, 
even in the absence of the physical signs of it? Even in this digital age with our awareness of 
the ambivalence of the relationship between photography and reality we still privilege and 
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attribute an authenticity to that which is captured photographically, making it a reliable 
medium for reproducing and/or recreating the reality of another.  
 
 
II.2. Feminist art: body as canvas for identity construction 
Every picture is a picture of a body. Every work of visual art is a representation of the body 
(Elkins, 1999). To say this is to say that we see bodies, even where there are none, and that 
the creation of a form is to some degree also the creation of a body. And if I splash of paint or 
a ruled grid can be a picture of the body, or the denial of a body, then there must be a desire at 
work, perhaps among the most primal desires of all: we prefer to have bodies in front of us, or 
in our hands, and if we cannot have them, we continue to see them, as afterimages or ghosts. 
This is a beautiful and complicated subject, the way our eyes continue to look out at the most 
diverse kinds of things and bring back echoes of bodies.  
―Distortion‖ is such a term: it is connected to philosophic discourse on representation in 
general, and it is both elemental and specific in body images of all kinds. Claude Gandelman 
names one aspect of the equation between the represented body and distortion when he says 
that the ―reality of the body qua repraesentatio is its essential distortion,‖ (Gandelman, 1991, 
p. 74) and I would argue that the opposite and correlative aspect is the essential bodily form 
toward which all representation tends. Any representation of a body involves distortion, 
because all representation is distortion, and conversely, representation works within a logic of 
the body, so that representation is embodiment: it produces and projects bodies.  
Pain signifies that mode of awareness that listens to the body and is aware of its feeling-  
whether that feeling is the low-level muttering of a body in good health or the high pain of 
illness. In the same way, pictures of the body normally work to preserve certain bodily 
properties so that distortion is usually local and specifiable. The danger is in generalizing, as 
Gandelman does, and implying that everything in representations of the body is equally 
within the field of distortion. Instead, bodily distortion is both a condition and a property of 
representation but both the whole of it and that is what allows the analysis of represented 
bodies to go forward without turning into an equation of holistic properties: a body‘s reality 
qua repraesentatio is some distortion. When representing the body in pain, the artist assumes 
a double distortion- by pain and by representation itself, the second being intended, controlled 
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one. In the end,  any representation of the suffering body is a distortion of a distortion. Being 
accustomed in the history of art to see beautiful women bodies represented almost in 
exclusively by men, I will try to analyze the works of female artists who use their bodies, not 
to please the gaze of others, but as a space for the identity construction.  
Since representations always have consequences for the understanding of who we are and 
who we want to become (Dyer, 1993), the interconnectedness of pain and se lf-portrait is a 
helpful tool in mapping female identity. Can artistic production help us grasp the concept of 
diseases and traumas? How do artists situate their own painful bodies? Is there a way to grasp 
fluid and changing formations of the body in pain? 
Over the centuries, pain and suffering have always been expressed in art: among others, by 
female contemporary or modern artists. In some cases these artworks express the artist's pain 
ascribable to diseases and terminal illness, or mental health problems that might stem from 
childhood traumas. 
The artists and artworks mentioned here are complex and go far beyond the concept of 
―feminist arts‖; put in plural, since feminist arts and feminist art critique comprise different 
currents that cannot be reduced to a single categorization. On a formal level, the heterogeneity 
of the representation of pain will be demonstrated in this paper. The criteria, here, is the rule-
breaking aspects of the arts and its formal sophistication, without attempting to examine all  
those modern and contemporary artists who have worked in this vein.  
The artworks described here can neither be reduced to the experience of pain, nor can the 
artists be constitutionally or biographically simplified to any particular denominator in the 
psychopathology of mental health. Yet, they can help us to understand pain, since art is a 
symbolic language, which due to its atemporal character condenses the intensity of pain in the 
present, the possible explanations for it in the past, and the potential transformation for the 
future (Gadamer, 1997). Thus art can open the horizon for transcending the individual and 
present aspects of pain, as well as providing insights into both spectator and author. These 
aspects are of importance in art therapy and art psychotherapy, where patients, beyond 
verbalization, can express themselves through art materials, in a special, safe environment 
determined by the infrastructure and the training of the art therapist.  
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Hannah Wilke is known as a controversial figure within the feminist art of the 1970s. She 
started to challenge the significances of the body within the art process by making fleshy 
sculptures of vaginal shapes out of clay and latex. After her mother had a stroke and was 
diagnosed with a second round of breast cancer in 1978, Wilke had to withdraw from her art 
studio and became the caregiver of her mother. Actually, in terms of art, Wilke continued to 
have a prolific period. She started taking pictures of her mother in order to have the illusion of 
permanence, of immortality over the certitude of the passing away of her mother. She 
intended to feel again with her mother, but this time- to heal her own wounds. After the death 
of her mother, the artist organised an exhibition with all these pictures together with womb-
like sculptures and graphics. Thus, Wilke‘s work became a prototypical attempt of 
representing the breast cancer in visual arts.    
Her work Portrait of the Artist with Her Mother, Selma Butter consists in two large-scale 
portraits juxtaposing Wilke‘s beautiful, voluptuous torso highly esteticized and put in 
evidence by miniature toy weapons; and her mother‘s aged, ill body in terminal breast cancer.  
In many of her works, Wilke appears as a model trying to deconstruct the stereotyped 
paradigm of the female beauty. With the Hannah‘s attempt to represent the ―unrepresentable‖ 
Hannah Wilke: Portrait of the Artist with Her Mother, Selma Butter. From the So 
Help Me Hannah Series (1978-1981) 
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and the ―unpresentable‖ it was reviewed within the field of art the concept of body, and 
especially the female body. How much disease might be a topic for art and how can these two 
interact, it was a main issue of Wilke‘s works after being herself diagnosed with lymphoma in 
1987. Her self-portraits of Intra-Venus (1992-1993), transposing the language of disease in 
another semiotic register- the visual one, turn the private experience into a public 
documentation  of a highly controversial matter. At the same time, Wilke mobilized the artists 
to explore more the objectification and commodification of the female body issue. At this 
point, art gains a political aspect.  
Jo Spence (England, 1934–1992) used photographic practice as a personal form of therapy, 
demonstrating in many of her artworks the 
impact of her cancer. 
Starting from the ―postmodern 
photographic activity‖ movement that 
opposed the hyper-aesthetic photography of 
the seventies, Spence considered her 
photographic activity to be a political, 
deconstructive strategy in denaturalizing 
photographic realism and redefining artistic 
and social practice. In this sense, the 
representation was a space of conflict and 
social struggle (Ribalta, 2005, p. 8). She 
aimed to reactivate photography as a 
popular culture in opposition to the 
fetishization of photography within official 
institutions of art and culture, such as 
museums and galleries. 
 
Spence aspired to use photography as a means of regaining control of her own image. In this 
sense, she privileged autorepresentation, declining to photograph others, since the relationship 
of photographer/photographed is never democratic: there is always an imbalance of power.  
Jo Spence: The Body is the Hero 
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 Spence converted photography into an instrument of rebellion and therapy for the pathologies 
caused by the symbolic violence of 
normalized lifestyles reproduced by 
the dominant images of the cultural 
sphere. She invariably emphasized 
the educational dimension of her 
practice. In this sense, Spence was 
not working primarily for an official 
artistic public or context. The role of 
―subaltern counterpublics‖ – for 
example unions, students, therapy 
groups, feminist groups, 
photography workshops, and 
community centers – is crucial here, 
on account of their potential for 
social transformation in contrast to 
mere reproduction or consumerism (Ribalta, 2005, p. 10). 
 
After 1982, the year her breast cancer was first diagnosed, for the most part her work 
addressed the representation of health, regarding stereotypes of gender and class. Her 
series Pictures of Health (1982–86) documents her experience of disease and critiques the  
process of infantilization, victimization, and depersonalization that she herself experienced as 
a patient. It also documents the day-to-day realities of living with the disease and her research 
into new life patterns and alternative therapies. The camera  becomes a tool for raising 
questions, rather than affirmations and confirmations (Roberts, 2005). 
In 1984, she commenced her own phototherapy, through which she intended to establish the 
political and therapeutic potential of life stories and the restaging of traumatic family 
experiences, such as her relationship with her mother or the imposition of stereotyped 
behavioral patterns concerning gender and class. She conceived innovative photographic 
techniques, with the use of dramatization inspired by the Epic Theatre of Brecht and Augusto 
Boal's Theatre of the Oppressed – for example in  Libido Uprising (1989) – with the aim of 
actively deconstructing asphyxiating conditions and structures, which are themselves 
unleashed and maintained by images. In this work, Spence considered herself a photographer-
educator (Roberts, 2005). These ideas followed her previous research into the family album, 
Jo Spence: Decay Project  
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which aimed to go beyond the official family discourse, usually represented by pictures of 
births, baptisms, weddings, birthdays, holidays, houses, schools, etc. Working on her family 
story, she revisited the past, recovering ―disallowed‖ images, such as divorces, insults, 
arguments: in short, conflicts. She also pursued this work with her patients, with the aim of 
using phototherapy as a ―visual map of your psychological processes‖ (Roberts, 2005, p. 99). 
If such conflictive images were not available, they were restaged, clients becoming active 
subjects who were able to rewrite their ―supposedly‖ given story. 
 
The advantage of photography lies in its approachability as a technique for ordinary people. 
Using this advantage, Spence acted as a photographer-educator and phototherapist beyond all 
norms of certified and licensed psychotherapy or clinical psychology practice, but from the 
position of both a skilled photographer and one with an embodied political knowledge. In this 
context, therapy is embedded in a political context, considering it in a way that is able to 
deconstruct institutionalized models and points of view. New ways of inhabiting the world are 
then offered (Longoni, 2011). The possibility of change through agency should be 
transmitted. In Spence's own words: ―Through the political knowledge of yourself you can 
advance and go beyond the perfect image‖ (Ribalta, 2005, p. 14). The art-practice of going 
―beyond the perfect image‖ to which she was aspiring resists the risk of permanent stasis. In 
this sense, Spence always stressed that the process of experimentation and learning should 
never stop with the finished artwork. It continues afterwards giving space for further 
reflection, insights, knowledge, agency, modifications, and change.  
 
For her, as for all the artists in this paper, art was a vital process, although for Spence it was 
also to be collocated in a socialist context (Roberts, 2005). She aspired to a global sphere, 
starting from her own or her clients‘ personal situation and aiming to reach a wider political 
sphere, connecting the individual image and story to a broader institutional and political 
context (Spence, 2005). She strove to reunite social and personal identities, politicizing 
personal narratives and personalizing politics (Grover, 2005). 
 
Cindy Sherman‘s art can be read as a symptom of pain, a reflection of a mental state. 
Sherman shows pain as a structural instability, the blurring of the boundaries of stereotyped 
femininity. Like her own artistic persona, pain in Sherman‘s work is de- individualized; it 
might just as well be the pain of an author, a model, a character or a viewer. Abandoning any 
claim on notions such as authorship or intentionality, Sherman disowns – but does not 
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disembody – pain. Pain in Sherman‘s art changes the body in the same way that emotional 
crisis watermarks the identity. Sherman never shows her characters as what is widely 
understood as idealized figures. Her art forms the counterpart to the American cult of the 
well- functioning, toned-down body, where any memory of pain had been erased. Pain denied 
elsewhere here becomes pain transformed into monstrosity, nausea, pathology, hysteria, and 
disguise. Sherman‘s photographs force the viewer to acknowledge the amount of pain 
constituting the female subject.  
 
Sherman‘s work has been mostly looked upon through its relevance to postmodern theory and 
its new aesthetic characterized by pastiche, self- referentiality, fragmentation, hybridization 
and multiplicity.  The body in her art has been conceptualized as a seat of passions, emotions 
and desires, the site of sexuality, the site of illness and death in reference to massive AIDS 
awareness in the 1980s and 1990s, and finally, the space marked as different, as other. 
Sherman‘s art has mostly been connected to psychoanalytic readings, used as a means to 
identify and to disrupt the production of the current forms of sexual difference. Her work 
called for a new conceptual approach, influenced by semiotics, the unspoken and 
unrepresented conditions of signification, and by feminist theory. The major critical writing 
on the artist consists of a corpus of explicitly feminist texts on difference, gender and 
sexuality.  
 
Although often regarded in terms of violence, terror, repression, anxiety and psychosis, 
Sherman‘s work has not 
been directly connected to 
pain. It is significant that the 
most aggressive of 
Sherman‘s series have 
received proportionally the 
least commentary. 
Nevertheless, the series 
made after Film Stills better 
fit my argument and 
exemplify the concept of 
pain more clearly. The Cindy Sherman: Untitled Film Stills 
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concept of pain as one of the most frequent symptoms of bodily crisis is crucial to my 
understanding of Sherman‘s subsequent series: Fashion  
 
Pictures, Disaster Pictures, Disgust Pictures and the Clown Series. Sherman‘s photographs 
form an account of pain in the female subject; they describe the nature of the relationship 
between pain and several types of concepts commonly seen as female, such as hysteria, 
monstrosity, grotesque or bulimia. Cindy Sherman‘s art makes one realize that pain, besides 
being cellular damage, is a reflection of the mental state, and as such can help to read visual 
accounts of the struggle to preserve feminine identity.  
 
Pain is a deeply psychoanalytic concept. The incapacity to tolerate frustration causes failure 
of the symbolic function, and the consequent failure of the thinking process, resulting in 
repression and the occurrence of symptoms. Cindy Sherman‘s photographs are the metaphors 
of painful experiences, with no systematic discourse, but at the same time deeply embedded 
and continuously inscribed in her art. Sherman‘s works illustrate the way in which those 
experiences have entered into the domain of popular media and culture, re-constructing 
femininity as present in art, fashion magazines, pornography, cinema and cultural clichés. In 
visual representation the problem of female embodiment – immaterial, fluid, transcendent, 
modified - is particularly relevant to the notion of crisis that pain brings along. According to 
Showalter, women are ―human beings who will convert feelings into symptoms when we are 
unable to speak‖ (Showalter, 1997, p. 207). Consequently, I think that Sherman presents 
symptoms that make bodily comfort and wellbeing impossible. As Bryson (1993) points out, 
a significant obstacle for understanding the body lies in the issue of pain. Pain makes the body 
oscillates between being a material, autonomous entity and an object of a scientific study 
reduced to a piece of flesh. Pain marks the limits of the language and comprehension; there 
are very few signs one could exchange for his or her pain to push it into representational 
codes. I would nevertheless argue that pain can be traceable in Sherman‘s photographs, but 
only if one moves beyond the concept of pain as tissue damage.  
 
The body in Sherman‘s art, manipulated and shattered by the voyeuristic gaze, 
instrumentality, absence of sexual taboos, and pornographic and advertising practices, can no 
longer bear any pretence to wholeness and integrity.  
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It has been marked as a symbol of a pathological, disintegrating identity. Just as it could be 
useful for feminist purposes, Sherman‘s art could be considered as reenacting the long history 
of female oppression. Burton (2006) argues that Sherman‘s characte rs are usually read as 
passive and preyed upon, threatened by the media-produced male gaze. Dead, sick, 
unconscious, crazy, pathological women caught in the dramatic moments of collapse or 
madness; seen as half-animals, mannequins and hybrids surrounded by dirt, rubbish, chaos, 
vomit, emptiness, and darkness, they are stripped of any integrity as subjects as they are being 
looked upon. While Sherman shows her women characters in the network of power relations 
already existing, it is simultaneously an active process of questioning those relations and 
submitting to them. It has been 
speculated that Sherman‘s enormous 
commercial success is based on the 
voyeuristic pleasure with which 
images of women are looked at.  
 
Critically reading feminist scholarship 
on Sherman, I try to look at her art 
anew and present the ways in which 
concepts such as hysteria, abjection, 
monstrosity or grotesque can be seen 
as painful. Pain causes metamorphosis; 
it causes one to change, sometimes 
unrecognizably. Being disquietingly 
someone else in every photograph, 
Sherman presents the fluctuating crisis 
of female embodiment. Canguilhem 
(1966) stated that the subject in pain undergoes a drastic change when falling sick, becoming 
detached from the image of itself from before. Sherman‘s art complies with that statement. 
That is why the problem of self-portrait is so relevant in her case. ―I don‘t do self-portraits‖ 
said Sherman in an interview, ―I always try to get as far away from myself as possible in the 
photographs. It could be, though, that it‘s precisely by doing so that I create a self-portrait, 
doing these totally crazy things with these characters‖ (in: Bronfen, 2003, p. 413).  
 
Cindy Sherman: Untitled 
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Being an actress, director, stylist and camerawoman in one, she is turning herself into the 
image that she herself directs. The range of Sherman‘s artistic self-transformation is 
astonishing. Using wigs, makeup, dresses, accessories, background and lightning, she puts 
herself into any age, personality, body type, mood, and narrative. While the classical genre  of 
self-portrait usually shows an artist in a staged pose, assuming to show the ―essence‖ of one‘s 
personality, Sherman‘s photographs are very stereotyped, almost-but-not-quite-recognizable 
pictures with a wide number of possible readings. Using her own body, Sherman mediates 
between the physicality of her flesh and the image of it she creates: over-familiar archetypes 
of film starlet, fashion model, housewife and career woman. While the genre of the female 
portrait traditionally constitutes a framework to explore femininity, this femininity is here 
deconstructed by presenting media images and cultural clichés. Using herself as a blank 
canvas, she never refers to her individual features: ―People are going to look under the 
makeup and wigs from that common denominator, the recognizable. I‘m trying to make other 
people recognize something of themselves rather than me‖ (in: Bronfen, 1986, p. 416). All 
those changes make Sherman‘s body – the signifier of the artist‘s presence – disappear. That 
self effacement is disquieting and troubling. I would argue however that understanding 
Sherman‘s work is to partly recognize it as self-portrait. The key to that understanding is the 
materiality of the body. Sherman‘s body is always materially present in the photograph. It 
restricts her in its physical characteristics. Being white, she only explores white femininity. 
Being a woman, she almost always presents female figures.  
 
Sherman‘s photographs are the proof that we almost never experience ourselves out of our 
bodies. We are always basically able to distinguish ourselves from the others by setting bodily 
boundaries. Even if when looking at our image in the mirror we sometimes experience the 
feeling of distance and detachment, we still remain the subject within this image. To 
constitute ourselves as embodied subjects through technologies of representation, we need the 
body. The only moment the artist escapes those restrictions is when she stops showing her 
body. ―What could I possibly do when I want to stop using myself and don‘t want ‗other 
people‘ in the photos?‖ asks Sherman in her notes (in: Cruz 1997, p. 163). The answer is 
artificial parts, dummies, toys, mannequins, prostheses, masks and occasionally empty 
photographs without people in them. Those solutions present an interesting case for any 
research on pain. As much as we need the body to conceptualize about pain, pain remains in 
Sherman‘s photographs even when the body is replaced by plastic and rubber. Although 
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depersonalized, Sherman‘s photographs are a self-reflexive attempt to establish identity 
politics in the situation of crisis.  
 
All the above artists have treated pain on very different formal levels. However, they share in 
common a disrespect and disregard for authority in a highly constructive way. They overcome 
formal classifications to create new forms that themselves prove unc lassifiable. None of these 
artists is committed to any one particular aesthetic, neither – in both their art and lives – do 
they accept authorities that would impose styles or conventions. Their art could be said to go 
hand in glove with their personalities, raising the impossibility of separating their artwork 
from their lives. What they also share is the feeling of needing art as a vehicle to express, 
treat, and perhaps even transcend pain, by placing it outside, into artistic creation. Moreover, 
all of them engage in ritualistic dynamics in their pain related artworks.  
 
It should be noted, however, that (Sontag, 2003) critiques the superabundance of images that 
has led to a situation of complete saturation, and hence to the impossibility of moving the 
spectator. Here she elects for an ecology of images, since the sheer flow excludes the 
privileged image. She favors reserved spaces for serious reflection. In short, Sontag reminds 
us that it is important how images in general are disseminated and how they are perceived. A 
pain-transforming artwork, however, should be considered a special case, requiring not only 
sufficient material in and of itself, but also a situation conducive to the process of serious and 
absorbing contemplation. Both conditions need to be fulfilled before it can offer insights.  
 
 
II.3. Kir Esadov: Metaphors of suffering 
―I believe you simply need to develop pictures whose aesthetics meet your sense of beauty 
and attach it to your personality, like your sense of humor or intellect, or compassion, or 
anxiety, or perversions, or whatever eats you up inside the most.‖ 
 Kir Esadov 
Born in 1988, Kir Esadov is a contemporary photographer from Russia, currently based in 
Moscow. He received a B.A. in social pedagogy in 2008. After graduating, he worked in 
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anorphanage for children with severe speech disorders.In 2011 he graduated from the 
Rodchenko Art School. He had several solo exhibitions in Russia and many other group 
exhibitions in Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Kiev, Zrenjanin, Belgrade, Bratislava, Houston. Kir 
Esadov is represented by Meglinskya Galleryand Fotodepartment.At the moment he works as 
a freelancer theatre photographer. I was in Moscow and had the chance to meet Kir Esadov, to 
see his works and get to know his own perspective on it.  
Kir Esadov grew up in a circus family in Moscow, surrounded by people who perceived 
magic as something ordinary. Over time, his photography developed into a construction of the 
intimate and the exposed self. Indiscriminately mixing together documentary and play-like 
photography, Kir Esadov recreates his deeply personal microcosm, a very brutal place, sore, 
but still magical. ―I became a photographer because I have no perseverance to write― states 
Kir Esadov suggesting his acute necessity of expressing himself. ―I feel that I can never do 
consistent photographic series. My goal is to create a massive and complete view of my tiny 
and immature inner anxiety. Very slowly, step by step, this micro world is forming from 
pieces, fragments, shards of the physical world.‖ There is of obvious relevance the fact that 
Kir Esadov‘s passion for photography is grounded in a decisive event of his life- while a 
student, Kir Esadov had a car accident that immobilized him for more than one year and left 
him disabled. In his desperate loneliness, he discovered the photography as the only way of 
reintegrating his fragmented self and a means to 
connect to the outside world. People whom Esadov 
uses to photographs are bearers of his own pain- 
cancer or AIDS sufferers, disabled people, or 
people who had an emotional trauma. Even if 
makes their portraits, Kir Esadov affirms that does 
this for his own therapy. None of the works 
presented below has a title.   
 
 I will explore the way he uses the self portraits, 
both to depict the emotional nature of these 
relationships as well as to bolster his wounded, 
readily fragmented, and often depleted sense of self. 
I will focus extensively on the experience of 
selfhood and the creation of self structure, most particularly on that stage of self and object 
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differentiation in which the other is experienced as a part of the self for the purposes of 
tension relief as well as to establish a sense of self cohesion. I will use the termselfobject to 
refer to the symbiotic way in which a person whose emotional development has been arrested 
during early stages might use others for the purpose of maintaining a coherent sense of self.It 
seems that Esadov uses his self portraits as twinship selfobjects (i.e., to soothe himself while 
having reflected back to his an unflawed mirror image of himself, with whom he could 
experience an essential alikeness).  
 
Suffering from anxiety and extreme insecurity, he considers that the aspects of his psyche 
would be better externalized, in his photographs. According to Esadov, his work is close to 
ideas of the soul and introspection, ―to inner feelings. […] They are indoor things‖.  He 
always maintains that art is essential to life, like breathing: a necessity rather than a joyful 
activity, which undermines the boundaries between art and life. For Esadov, art is an essence, 
―coming from the inside of a person‖. It is as if the frailty of his materiality mirrors his own 
fragility,alongside the desire to contain this vulnerability, while always being conscious of its 
impermanence. Esadov's idea is to exorcize through the body the phantasmatic, which he 
locates there. He calls phantasmatic the consequences of traumatic experiences that block the 
creative potential of the human being. 
 
His iconographic metaphors deepen the 
relationship he tries to establish with the world, 
because they clearly communicate the extent of 
his fear. Esadovs's use of rich symbolic imagery 
create a vivid sense of his connections to his 
past, present, and future. Linking memories and 
increasing the therapeutic effect contribute to 
autobiographical coherency, a necessary 
ingredient for mending adult disrupted 
attachment. 
 
Esadov's art is, in fact, an expressive movement 
toward less painful possibilities. This change 
was facilitated by his awareness, availability of 
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positive emotions, rich language, and creativity. Each art request provide him the opportunity 
to look at a different aspect of himself. He is ultimately able to imagine how the exploration 
of the sensory, emotional, cognitive, and social aspects of pain can give hope. 
―Draw the problem‖ encourages the person to tell the story of the pain: the sensory impact, 
the medical history, how stress, fear, and emotion may be involved, and insights as to how the 
problem is perceived. The positive relational resonance can create a holding environment for 
the processing and expression of pain through the art.  
The second art request pulls for the mental image of the self. It is an invitation to explore how 
the pain affects the development and maintenance of selfhood. The autobiographical portrait 
includes clues to his attachment style. This is important given the potential meshing of 
attachment styles and vulnerability to pain.  
The third request asks for a depiction of internal and external resources that help the prob lem. 
This request invites cognitive awareness and provides a glimpse of hope and change. It elicits 
interpersonal resources and optimally evokes positive expectations and, most importantly, a 
sense of control. 
The final request invites an image of the self now, or the image of the self without pain, in the 
future. A focus on the future also supports the visual exploration and concretization of a 
renewed mental self- image. To ascertain the potential for change, it is useful to discuss and 
compare few self-portraits.  
 
My general concern in this section is the question how, depicting his disabled body, Kir 
Esadov expresses his subjectivity through his photographs. My main point would be that 
rather than unity and fixed position, the subject‘s fluctuation and variability are the theme of 
those photographs of the body in crisis. To argue that, I trace how Esadov presents his 
embodiment and his situatedness in his self-portraits, or portraits of other people, or even 
photographs with animals which do not cease to be representations of his suffering.  
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My argument is that in the case of bodily crisis, 
representation is an effective mode to trace back 
one‘s identity and to re-constitute the subject 
endangered by this crisis. I will use Esadov‘s 
example to show how representation, and in 
particular self- representation, forms a tool of 
construction, not decomposition.4 Rather than 
accepting van Alphen‘s argument on the 
disintegrating feature of representation, I will 
argue here that the conception of the fluid self, 
introduced as unstable and unreliable, does not 
have to be perceived as negative (destructive or 
unrepresentable). The de-composing can turn out 
to be the constituting. The ―undoing of life‖ can 
turn out extremely helpful in the study of 
Esadov‘s work. The response to the problem of pain in Esadov‘s art by critics is in my 
opinion often speculative, and therefore unconvincing. It reminds a lot of the painter Frida 
Kahlo.  Instead of re-positioning the imagery of pain and victimization, existing critics, even 
if they are few and insignificant yet, in 
fact, they use Esadov‘s disability only as a 
tool for organizing his works, turning 
away from the problem of pain itself. The 
artist is associated with his pain, eclipsed 
by his pain.    
 
There might be suggestions of self-
inflicted or imagined pain regarding the 
photograph of Esadov, pain that he uses 
on others and on himself.Nevertheless, I 
find in extremely inaccurate to transform 
Esadov‘s disability into narcissistic 
                                                                 
4
Also Elkins (1999) engages in the problem of representation as bodily distortion, stating that any representation 
of a body involves distortion, because all representation is distortion. 
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longing for love and admiration, just as much as I disagree with portraying Esadov‘s illness as 
a sort of incentive that inspired him to photograph.By ignoring clear iconography of pain in 
Esadov‘s photographs the whole concept of pain remains problematic to interpretation.  
 
I defend the thesis that photographing his disabled body is to Esadov an act of retrieving his 
self- image and finding the coherence within assembled pieces of identity. Esadov is an 
interesting response to Bacon, if we forget the linearity of time for a mo ment. Although 
divided by the differences of culture, education, sexuality, personal histories, and modes of 
expression, those two artists share similarities that should be acknowledged. Embodiment, for 
instance, is absolutely central in both Bacon‘s and Esadov‘s work. It is also central to 
viewer‘s understanding of their work.  
 
I intend to draw the comparison between the body in pain presented by Esadov and by Francis 
Bacon. In his book on Bacon, Ernst van Alphen (1992) writes about ―a momentary loss of 
self‖ in the moment of perception of an artwork. Looking at Bacon‘s painting, a viewer 
temporarily loses his or her capacity to reflect on it. Representation in this case is a loss of 
self both for a viewer and for the subject of representation; it is an act of decomposing and 
killing the subject. It is not followed by perception; it is rather the process of perception that 
concludes with representation. The deformation of Bacon‘s figures is therefore proof of the 
lack, or disintegration, of identity. Van Alphen, arguing with Jacques Derrida‘s statement that 
there is no life outside the representation (Derrida, 1987), points out how ―affective‖ 
representation in Bacon‘s works exposes the crumbling of a coherent subject. He denies 
representation‘s constitutive character, its life-giving power. Representation is not life; it is 
rather life that turns out to be representation (van Alphen, 1992). 5 Along with destroying the 
language of a sufferer, the notion of pain present in Bacon‘s paintings also tends to destroy 
the conceptualization abilities and language of a viewer. However, while Bacon‘s bodies are 
deformed and blurry, Esadov‘s photographs, blurry as well, are opened, meditative, with 
oneiric character. While Bacon addresses the viewer in a most sensory way, Esadov‘s 
photographs have more ―calming‖ effect – they appeal to one‘s feeling the silence, the space, 
the body that is weightless.  
 
                                                                 
5
Van Alphen adopts a similar approach in h is analysis of the art of Dutch artist Armando, referring to violence of 
the World War II. There again he argues for the unspeakability and unrepresentability of death (in: Goodwin and 
Bronfen, 1993). 
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Much like Bacon‘s, Esadov‘s photographs might be perceived as works on suffering and 
disintegration. I, nonetheless, would insist on reading his art as work on suffering and re-
integration. The body does not connect to any 
sense of integrity or solidity in Bacon‘s work. 
My argument is that in Esadov‘s work, it does. 
That might be because Esadov represents his 
own body and even when he represents the body 
of others, he is projecting his pain. The position I 
want to defend is that Esadov‘s work is about 
constructing, not de-constructing the subject. Re-
integration is a process that can often go 
unnoticed, and that demands a certain effort from 
a viewer. It is nevertheless useful, even crucial, 
to know more about that ―moment of loss‖ van 
Alphen writes about. Van Alphen quotes 
Bacon‘s intention to ―hit the nervous system‖ of 
a viewer (van Alphen, 1992, p. 11).  
 
Agony, pain, screams, paralytic movements evoke anxiety and disturbance in an even 
slightest empathetic recipient of Bacon‘s painting. Watching Esadov‘s works, I notice that the 
drama and agony are not so violent, but even peaceful. Pain does not burst out from the 
photograph; instead, it becomes more and more intense with looking, it catches the viewer 
and gradually immerses him into its universe. While in Bacon‘s work disintegration of the 
self is accentuated by powerfully violent aesthetics, Esadov adopts elements of nature- trees, 
clouds, animals; shows just parts of the body or even just silhouettes; and relies much on the 
background. Like Bacon‘s figures, the ones of Esadov are shapeless, unfinished, skinless and 
chaotic. The view I would argue is that Esadov, on his part, invites the viewer to join his 
suffering, making her or him the integral part of constituting his identity. He carefully 
constructs himself in various settings, creating an artistic persona, turned to the audience. 
Figures in Bacon‘s paintings, whether it is a paralytic child, female nude, screaming man or a 
dwarf, are disfigured, shattering the viewer‘s sense of self, and the subject‘s sense of self.  
 
Pain in Esadov‘s photographs is still massively acknowledged, even if subtly hidden, although 
violence is less striking, or maybe just not as quickly happening – it is a slow, constant 
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process, not a spasm. Examining the styles used by those two artists can be helpful while 
analysing the fluctuating presence of the subject. Whereas Bacon lets us hear a terrifying 
scream revealing muscles under the skin, Esadov reverses the process by giving us an 
unflinching mask, a shadow instead of a face. All this subdues the dynamic of expression, but 
not its intensity. In re-drawing attention to Esadov‘s work, rather than his biography, a viewer 
has a chance to become aware of the problem of visibility/invisibility of pain.  
 
Esadov‘s work fits very broadly into a type of portraiture, in so much as his work portrays 
people, though perhaps more ‗in motion‘ than traditional portraiture. This allows Esadov to 
choreograph his photographs with tactility using various kinds of lines, shading, tones of 
black and white, and space to frame and explore his ideas, develop the content and create 
particular moods. His use of centrifugal, 
evanescing lines is a particularly articulate 
texture within his work, leading our eyes around 
the composition while gesturing to something 
beyond or outside the image. In some works the 
lines are not definitive, marking people beside 
one other and apart from one other. Such 
expressions of relationships are also conveyed by 
Esadov‘s use of shadows and small lines that 
appear as wave patterns indicating a sense of 
movement or active e/motion. Esadov also uses a 
grey scale as content and expression. For 
example, he uses muted shades in grey which 
give expression to the people in the photographs 
while gesturing to an ambiguous (at times definitively detached) relationship to one another. 
Esadov explains: ―… maybe there are a lot of greys because I see things in grey, not black 
and white. I am drawn to complex and murky situations‖. Similarly, Esadov uses space to 
shape and give texture to the content. The relationship of positive space- space that is filled 
with objects or subject- to negative space- space that is empty or between objects or subjects- 
often mirrors the relationships within the image. His photographs contain very little object 
detail and might been described as stark.  
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This in between, or negative space, though perhaps not the subject itself, is germane and 
contours a theme that appears in much of Esadov‘s work: aloneness. The way Esadov has 
used negative space heightens the man‘s vulnerability and isolation and offers an expression 
of solitude that the viewer is left to witness, alone. This mirroring of emotions between what 
is in the drawing and what we feel as a viewer opens Esadov‘s work to reflect on our own 
experiences of suffering.    
 
Pain is not an abstract term; it concerns real body and interferes with body functioning. 
Similarly, illness is a physically experienced event.Nonetheless, the power of cultural codes 
and discourses to shape the physical experience of pain and illness has created a whole field 
in the narrative of medicine and sociology (Morris, 2000). Illness in our society has often 
been constructed as a metaphor; meaning built 
around AIDS is an example of general knowledge 
condemning politically suspect citizens. 
Persecuted groups – homosexuals, prostitutes, 
drug addicts - are seen by the community as 
violating socially acceptable characteristics 
(Sontag, 1990). Therefore, representation of pain 
and disability engage questions about its locus, its 
destructive powers, its perception by others. In 
his book Disease and Representation, Sander L. 
Gilman claims that illness is a loss of control, that 
results in us becoming an Other. The fear of 
being the Other constructs a very stable and fixed 
image of disease, external to our sense of self. 
Accordingly, when brought in touch with 
artworks representing disorder, disease, or madness, we experience tension and anxiety about 
our self controlling powers (Gilman, 1988). The ambiguity involved in the way in which we 
read visual representations of pain and disease is a result of our sense of control and the 
process of othering. The positioning of an Other is a necessary moment in the constitution of 
any cultural body. Because our experience of the body is fragmented and limited, and more 
internal than external, it has been argued that only the presence of the other can bring 
wholeness to the subject (Grosz, 1994).The problem of disability as connected to the problem 
of the Other and to cultural processes of normalizing was introduced by Foucault.  
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The position I defend is that self-portrait has been a technique used by Esadov to counter the 
process of social and cultural ―othering‖. Esadov‘s art is an example of the visual constitution 
of otherness in the narrative of illness and pain. Through self-representation, through taking a 
look at himself from the outside, Esadov is able to establish himself as a viewer of the Other. 
The process of fixing and stabilizing the disease through artistic representation allowed him to 
deal with the fear of losing control of his self- image. This instability can also be noticed in the 
formal side of Esadovs‘s paintings. The figure of 
Esadov is most of the time grounded in the centre of 
the composition, but is not fixed, it is centrifugal, it is 
losing its materiality. The technique of ―visualizing‖ 
or ―dematerializing‖ the disease and extracting it from 
the body is a common practice among cancer patients 
(Stacey, 1997) and has its sources in shamanism and 
its rituals of ―pulling‖ the pain out of the body 
(Scarry, 1985). What is seen as a destructive force of 
representation: ―I feel that [the photograph] creates 
my body or mortifies it, according to its caprice‖ 
(Barthes, 1981, p. 10), Esadov reverses in his 
photographs. To examine Esadov‘s representations of 
pain and disability is to study that validation and its normative practices and validations 
constraining the body in crisis.  
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Like often in Esadov‘s works the landscape and the elements of nature, form a mirror where 
the physical/mental condition of Esadov is reflected. In this case, the landscape is almost 
agonizing, particularly on the 
side of the reclining Esadov. 
Scarry acknowledges the 
possibility of projection as a 
technique of dealing with pain: 
―the human being who creates 
on behalf of the pain in her own 
body may remake herself to be 
one who creates on behalf of 
the pain originating in 
another‘s body‖ (Scarry, 1985, 
p. 324). It provides him with a 
different kind of visual 
knowledge, a new way to negotiate the relationship between the inside and the outside of the 
body. In my choice of visual material here I am particularly concerned with the problem of 
externalization and internalization of 
pain. I point out how the experience of 
pain has been constructed using visual 
language, but also try to analyze how 
that experience sometimes attempts to 
escape all possible language. I argue 
that the effort to trace that language is 
formative to the mapping of male 
subject experiencing crisis of the body. 
Scarry (1985) draws our attention to 
how pain is often described through an 
―as if‖ structure: ―it feels as if a needle 
is going into my spine,‖ ―I feel as if a 
hammer is crushing my bones‖. The 
external object of pain is often introduced when talking about pain, even though the pain is 
coming from within. The subject‘s pain here is being transported into the external world of 
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things and symbols. Pain can also be internalized by carrying the objects of external world 
into the body.  
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IIIrd Chapter: Pain as collective experience 
III.1.Collective trauma.Imagery of suffering and horror  
Pain is not simply a private, interior state, but rather a mode of knowing (in) the world – of 
knowing and making known, which is contextual, contingent, specific and often fleeting. 
Recognizing this, we can begin to explore how pain already circulates within the contours of 
our relationality with others; here, pain is not relegated to the realm of immediate physical, 
emotional hurt, but also includes the emotional trauma, psychological distress, grief and 
mourning that pain often entails. In this section I will focus on the particularity on the 
representation of the collective pain, and when talking about collective pain, there are 
paradoxically involved two other concepts- anonymity and memory. It is not always clear 
where the boundaries lie between the one in pain, the one who inscribes that pain or the one 
who grieves that pain as a witness. The constitution of who we are is always made possible by 
our ties with, and not our separation from others. In other words, it is possible to access the 
pain of others as pain, and to have our own pain accessed by others by virtue of this 
relationality. This does not require us to discover or construct a universal expression or 
interpretation of pain - for example, a symbolic of pain as articulated through imagery -  in 
order to recognize and respond to pain. Perhaps it is precisely because we do not share a 
universal mode of expressing pain that we resist the possibility that pain behaviour is part of 
the pain process itself. 
 
Collective suffering and pain might be generated directly by the state- often the injury results 
from violence, such as assault and torture; or indirectly by people such as pollution, poverty, 
disasters. Such collective, long term actions have a strong, incontrollable impact on 
individuals at emotional and physical level. The line between human and-non human causes 
evanesces, even if all of them are, in fact, of anthropic origin. Regardless of the cause, is the 
individual who experiences pain. Paradoxically, provoking suffering intentionally is seen as a 
non-human; but being subjected to pain is a human or even sacred act, then representing pain 
caused by non-human actions, is an artwork.  
Research suggests that realism is an important contextual feature of media violence. Studies 
have shown that more realistic portrayals of violence may heighten levels of involvement and 
aggression.Because research has shown that not only the physical consequences, such as 
blood or dead bodies, but also the emotional results, such as people screaming or crying, may 
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seriously affect people. On the one hand, it may increase fear reactions, especially when 
children identify with the victims. However, the conveyance of realistic harm and pain cues 
may decrease aggression and desensitization. 
Images of the body in pain are the primary medium through which we come to know war, 
torture and other pain-producing activities. The Cartesian paradigm of subjectivity suggests 
that pain is an interior event that can only be imperfectly expressed through language or 
visuality. This creates a significant disjuncture between the body that experiences pain and the 
one who observes this body. The imperative to make pain visible is driven by the desire to 
access the pain of the other; but, in the context of the Cartesian subject, this access is 
simultaneously impossible. This paragraph explores as well the ethics of using such imagery 
for projects that seek to resist or oppose war and torture, and suggests alternative ways of 
understanding and responding to bodies in pain. 
Despite the apparent disconnect between the ‗objective‘ visual and the ‗subjective‘ or 
experiential tactile, the image of the body in pain animates and makes possible a whole host 
of political activities, from torture to military intervention to anti-war activities to critical 
social science scholarship. It is not a facile process to adjudicate between the ethics of 
privileging such imagery on the basis of intentionality alone. Indeed, manyof these practices 
rely on a techno-logic of the visual to validate their respective projects, and many rely on the 
circulation of abject imagery to illustrate and support their political claims. In turn, these 
practices fetishize pain in their drive to make visible what is essentially unimageable – that is, 
the spectrum of experience associated with the body in pain. The body in pain is thus 
produced as an aesthetical visual image, a symbolic icon that stands in for itself as the referent 
object of political violence.  
The Cartesian representation of the subject-self as a bounded interiority that relates to the 
world through language and other forms of expression is the underlying schematic on which 
accounts of pain are largely narrated. ElaineScarry (1985, p. 13) argues that to have pain is to 
have certainty; to hear about another‘s pain is to have doubt. The underpinning logic of this 
claim is the sovereign subject who experiences pain, and who can rely only on a series of 
imperfect and imprecise expressions in order to describe the sensation of that pain to others. 
The expression of pain is not to be understood as pain itself, but only a description of that 
which is happening inside the bounded body of the subject. For Scarry, pain is a uniquely 
inexpressible experience, because unlike desire, grief or love, physical pain takes no object. 
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For this reason, the visual expression of pain and trauma translates into a politics of 
representation that flattens the experience of pain by being able to capture only the visible 
causes or expressions of pain.  
One of the results of this is the development of an aesthetic imagery of pain-causing 
phenomena – an iconography of symbols that stand in for pain and thus become the 
representational alibis for actual pain: images of starvation, of emaciated concentration-camp 
victims, of hooded prisoners, of broken and bleeding skins, of blood-stained floors in prison 
cells, and so on. In the imaging of pain-causing phenomena and of bodies in pain, the 
specificity of the interior experience of pain, and of the subject that experiences it, is elided or 
even entirely evacuated. People become representations of their plights. As Feldman argues, 
we encounter ―generalities of bodies – dead, wounded, starving, diseased, and homeless. . .  In 
their pervasive depersonalization, they appear as an anonymous corporeality‖ (cited in 
Malkki, 1996, p. 388).  The fundamental inexpressibility of pain is the unsaid hypothesis on 
which a range of claims about torture, war, and death as primarily interior experiences (and 
thus doubtable experiences) are made possible. For Hannah Arendt, for example, the 
concentration-camp survivor, had he been able to return to narrate his experience, would not 
have been believed. The suffering in the camp as a space of profound and potentially limitless 
pain is understood to defy attempts at narration, because the capacity to express the content of 
that pain is understood to be severely curtailed.  
In interrogating collective pain in photography this section explores how trauma is often 
reliant on material formats to translate both its occurrence and its burden on the human 
condition. Our contemporary visual economy produces a materialization of culture where it is 
manifested not only through displays but structuring a modern way of seeing and 
comprehending. I position photography as both the social construction of the visual as well as 
the visual construction of the social. Both processes are iterative where neither is reductive or 
subsumed by any one element whether it is social, ideological or historical. Mitchell premises 
vision is that a cultural construction is learned and cultivated, and not simply given by nature. 
It is connected to the history of arts, technologies, media and social practices of display and 
spectatorship and is deeply involved with human societies with the ethics and politics, 
aesthetics and epistemology of seeing and being seen (Mitchell, 2006). In this case, 
photography evolves through a complex interplay of discursive and ideological debates 
mediating the ways in which we see, believe and make meaning. These processes do not 
thwart individual agency but they provide material and symbolic spaces for collective 
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identification. The increasing use of visuals and simulation technologies to experience or re-
live trauma no longer privileges the eye or the gaze alone but combines it with emotive 
elements to evoke sympathy. The intertwining of image with trauma and its distribution 
through a circulation economy is a resonant part of contemporary visual culture.  
 
Trauma needs an audience to bear witness, to work through the catharsis and to consign it to 
the annals of history where it can be repeatedly re-visited to make sense of other trauma that 
human societies inflict on each other or experience through natural disasters. Trauma equally 
has a face photography provides this ‗faciality‘ where these depictions both function as 
pictures of ‗re-memory‘ (Toni Morrison, 1987) and as narratives of history torn out of their 
historical contexts to be viewed with renewed horror. The ontological status of an image as 
bearing witness also calls into account how we valorize the image as a form of visual 
testimony. With real stories becoming a past, the past often becomes commodified through 
the visual. The emergence and popularity of ‗dark‘ tourism or tourism associated with sites of 
death, disaster and depravity (Foley and Lennon, 1999) is to a large extent dependent on 
symbols, physical spaces, artifacts and visuals. This visual economy is equally dependent on 
new media formats which shrink distance and temporality between the event and spectator 
where the circulation of iconic images create collective identification with an event producing 
a capsule memory.  
 
By studying the history of specific images, we can better understand how photographers 
meant to document events at the time were later transformed into both objects of art and 
emblems of memory. Photography is not simply illustration of historical narrative. We must 
examine how captions used in wartime photo became titles of exhibition photographs, how 
the placement and context of an image changed over time, and, most important, how the 
actual image changed as its role changed from documenting a moment in time to fostering 
reflection of the past. By doing this, we can trace how overlapping narratives of the war that 
informed one another at the time became competing memories of the past.  
 
The absence of the photographs depicting mere bodily injury and death contributes to what 
Elaine Scarry describes as ―the disappearance of the body‖ in contemporary war, despite the 
fact that ―injuring is, in fact, the central activity of war,‖ its ―obsessive content.‖ This central 
fact, Scarry notes, ―often slips from view‖ (Scarry, 1985, p. 67). The body‘s disappearance 
allows the state and the press to direct the public‘s attention to the ―mythic reality‖ of war, 
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rather than its ―sensory reality‖ in which ―we see events for what they are‖ and ―war is 
exposed for what it is- organized murder‖ (Hedges, 2002, p. 21).  
 
Approaching collective pain, especially war, there is one more term necessary to introduce- 
‗atrocity‘, the act of extreme cruelty and heinousness. It attributes the first use of this meaning 
of atrocity to Thomas Jefferson, who referred in 1793 to the ‗atrocities‘ committed by a 
Native American tribe.6  There is, then, a link between the concept of atrocity, public concern 
about it and periods of intensified humanitarian sentiment. Atrocity first emerged as a public 
discourse at the end of the eighteenth century - an era scholars have associated with cultures 
of sentimentalism that articulated new understandings of suffering and the body, and thereby 
prompted a wave of humanitarian action and a new fascination with pain.  
 
The photograph is a prophesy in reverse, as Roland Barthes divined. Men at arms are shot and 
shot again, shot in black and white. The classic war photographs (photographs of the classic 
wars) are all in black and white. The dead and the wounded bleed black blood; the young 
bleed into the old; the poison bleeds out, eventually. In the meantime, the bodies pile up. 
Contortionists, they practice composition. We goggle at them and try not to look. The artist 
was Goya, who knew more than enough of men and war. The mottos of his Disasters of War 
(1810–1820) are legendary: ―One cannot look at this‖, ―I saw it‖, ―This is the truth‖. Every 
war photographer has Goya on his shoulder (Danchev 2009). Don McCullin made these 
mottos his own. In his autobiography, he recalls coming on a father and two sons lying in a 
pool of their own blood in a stone house in Cyprus during the conflict of the 1960s. He is 
riveted by the scene, as much for the tableau as the tragedy. McCullin is an ethical 
professional. Still riveted when the rest of the family return, he is suddenly conscious of 
trespassing with his camera, but the survivors are content for him to do what he has to do: 
―When I realised I had been given the go-ahead to photograph, I started composing my 
pictures in a very serious and dignified way. It was the first time that I had pictured something 
of this immense significance and I felt as if I had a canvas in front of me and I was, stroke by 
stroke, applying the composition to a story I was telling myself. I was, I realized later, trying 
to photograph in a way that Goya painted or did his war sketches‖ (McCullin, 2002, p. 47).  
 
                                                                 
6
Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael and William Short, 30 June 1793, Thomas Jefferson Papers, Library 
of Congress, http://jeffersonswest.unl.edu/archive/view_doc. php?id=jef.00062.  
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In so building the image composition, the bodies and  the elements of décor convey the same 
of overwhelming pain. The faces may not look at us directly, but they address us 
unmistakably. The address is at once stoic and urgent. Eduardo Galeano has written of 
Sebastião Salgado‘s photographs of famine in the Sahel- another battlefield in another war: 
―These photos watch you. These people fix their gaze on you. They seem more dead than 
alive, exotic phantoms flowering in a desert of thorns tha t isn‘t of this world or of this time. 
But they look at you and silently they address you. My world is your world too, they say; my 
time is also your time‖ (Galeano, quoted in Salgado 2004, p. 133). Photographs may also be 
instruments of the imagination, tools for morals. Here is an answer to Susan Sontag‘s final 
question about photography, on which she brooded for so long. A photograph may be telling 
us: this too exists. 
 
Current academic, journalistic, and artistic work on war and its aftermath is part of a larger 
cultural movement reflecting what Annette Wieviorka has called ―the era of the witness.‖ In 
the era of the witness, testimonial discourse ―has become stereotypical [and] is embedded in 
the surrounding political discourse, which is, as it were, superimposed on  the testimonies that 
it in turn instrumentalizes‖( Wieviorka, 2006, p. 126). Verbal and visual discourses revolving 
around atrocity, genocide and mass killings are decidedly intimidating and powerful inasmuch 
as they are derived from and inevitably connected with the ―never again‖ often postulated in 
connection with Holocaust testimony. These discourses are also highly ambivalent: mass 
killings should never happen again but they do occur regularly- Cambodia, Bosnia, Sudan, 
Burundi, Somalia, the Congo, Rwanda, and so on. In addition, there is a tension between the 
survivors‘ often articulated need to tell their stories and the moral imperative to bear witness, 
thus emphasizing the individual‘s agency, on the one hand, and the experience of being 
reduced, in the process of giving testimony, to a victim and hence being denied agency, on the 
other hand (Wieviorka, 2006). The ―never again‖ discourse is also ambivalent because the act 
of giving testimony aims among other things to liberate individuals from their traumatic 
memories. However, it may actually undermine their subject positions in the postgenocide 
environment within which testimony is given and with which the act of testifying is intimately 
connected: the past may become bearable (to some extent), but the present may become 
unbearable. 
 
Visual representations are important components of many genocide discourses (Zelizer, 
1998). It may be argued that, in the era of the witness, visual representations, and especially 
83 
 
photography, have contributed a great deal to the delocalization and internationalization of the 
memory of war and genocide. Photography, however, covers and bears witness (in the sense 
alluded to in the quotation that opened this section) to different atrocities to different degrees. 
Neither images of actual killings, nor images of dead bodies explain the killings. Both often 
leave their audiences ―momentarily horrified but largely ignorant‖ (Keane, 1995, p. 7). In the 
era of the witness, the public are often consumers of crisis and ―spectator[s] to crisis,‖ rather 
than being witnesses in the more ambitious sense of ―responsible, ethical, participant‖ 
(Taylor, 2003, p. 243).  
 
Jill Bennett has shown in her work on trauma art, works of art including art photography, 
decoupled from the pressures under which photojournalism normally operates, are capable of 
raising political awareness and making the viewers think about both the conditions addressed 
in the works of art and their own involvement in and responsibility for these very conditions. 
Bennett suggests that the question should be asked ―of what art itself might tell us about the 
lived experience and memory of trauma . . . and [about] the experiences of conflict and loss.‖ 
With Bennett then the question arises ―what it is that art itself does that gives rise to a way of 
thinking and feeling about [trauma]‖ (Bennett, 2005, p. 2). In their work on photojournalistic 
icons, Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites argue that the ―daily stream of 
photojournalistic images . . . defines the public through an act of common spectatorship‖ 
(Hariman, 2007, p. 42). In a Habermasian discursive-action approach applied to images, they 
suggest that political space is nowadays constituted mainly through images. This 
argumentation contributes to the debate about the ethics of representing human suffering since 
it seems to imply that human suffering has to be visually represented, because otherwise the 
victims would be excluded from the political and no response to the conditions depicted in a 
given image would be possible. Without visual representation, victims would literally become 
invisible. As pictures cannot give the viewers the assurance they might like to be given, their 
contribution to this discourse appears limited. However, it is limited only as long as 
contribution is equated with explaining and understanding, which are normally regarded as 
the core concepts underlying academic knowledge production.  
 
The meaning of pictures is intangible and ephemeral, open to interpretation, and changeable 
over space and across time. Images are unsuitable for generalization and theory building; their 
relationship to any prior reality is highly problematic and their truth-value is limited. This 
helps explain why Western culture, although obsessed with images, simultaneously exhibits 
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some degree of uneasiness about them, often translated into the need to explain pictures rather 
than accept them for what they are- even though we do not know what they are exactly.  
Consider, for example, the numerous attempts to exp lain what Robert Capa‘s famous 
photograph ―Fallen Soldier‖ really shows (Mitchell, 1994).  While some of these 
interpretations complicate Capa‘s involvement in the scene and increase his responsibility for 
the soldier‘s death, the exact conditions under which the photograph was taken are almost 
irrelevant for the picture‘s continuing iconic power: ―the more one learns about the 
circumstances in which Capa made his famous photograph, the less those circumstances 
matter‖ (Dyer, 2008).  
 
Images of war and its aftermath should at the very least be regarded as vehicles with which to 
visualize the unbridgeable gap between an observer‘s perceptions of the depiction of 
another‘s pain, on the one hand, and the other‘s physical and emotional (i.e., lived experience 
of) pain, on the other hand. As beautiful images, they invite the standard criticism articulated 
in connection with the work, for example, of James Nachtwey and Sebastião Salgado, 
according to which aestheticization and depoliticization go hand in hand. In its crude version, 
the criticism that some forms of photographic representation aestheticize that which they 
depict while others do not is obviously flawed, as representation cannot not aestheticize; when 
representing something or someone, the option not to aestheticize does not exist. In its refined 
form, the criticism refers to images of human suffering that, due to their formal structure or to 
what in a given situation is understood as beauty, are assumed to be ―used as resources for  
gratification‖ and to offer the viewer ―disinterested pleasure.‖ Such images are said to abstract 
from the sources of the suffering depicted and the conditions under which it occurred and to 
obscure the ―meaning and implications‖ of suffering. They are accused of depoliticizing the 
viewers by diverting their attention from the depicted conditions of suffering to the quality of 
the image and the beauty of what it depicts. It is often assumed that there is a causal nexus 
between the formal structure and beauty of an image and the lack of political engagement 
with its subject on the part of the viewer. Exposed, in pain, to our look, people endure ―a 
second suffering‖ as long as we are looking and, by so doing, contribute to their exploitation 
and the theft of their subjectivity. Looking at their pain is, in this sense, a secondary 
exploitation.  
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III.2. Bodies in Pain and the Ethics of Photography 
 
The question of whether it is possible for us to recognize pain in the body of another, and 
what that might mean for rethinking our politics as we move deeper across the landscapes of 
the so-called war and atrocity, makes up the core concern of this thesis section. I want to pose 
that the drive to make visible the body in pain often evokes a particular kind of seeing, which 
ultimately works to further the Cartesian rupture between self and other. I want to pose that 
the imperative to make pain visible through representation actually works to contain and 
delimit the experience of pain by locating it so firmly in the distant and disconnected bodies 
of others that our ability to engage is relegated to that of observation, which severely limits 
the possibility of making response.  
 
I will argue that the inscription of pain through torture and war has been followed by a 
fetishization of pain through the recirculation of imagery. This fetishization is present even 
where the intended purposes of circulating the imagery are to oppose and resist torture and 
war. The drive to repetitively circulate the icon of the tortured body is to risk the circulation 
of the same logic of verifiability that animated the production of pain in the first place – that 
is, the appropriation of others‘ bodies through photography and their objectification toward 
the service of particular kinds of politics.  
 
This section will explore some of the ethical consequences that are associated with the 
imaging of pain, advancing the argument that the logic of the visual image risks the final 
obliteration of the human subject whose world is already undone by the experience of pain. 
The Cartesian representation of the subject-self as a bounded interiority that relates to the 
world through language and other forms of expression is the underlying schematic on which 
accounts of pain are largely narrated. Elaine Scarry (1985, p. 13) argues that to have pain is to 
have certainty; to hear about another‘s pain is to have doubt. The underpinning logic of this 
claim is the sovereign subject who experiences pain, and who can rely only on a series of 
imperfect and imprecise expressions in order to describe the sensation of that pain to others. 
The expression of pain is not to be understood as pain itself, but only a description of that 
which is happening inside the bounded body of the subject. For Scarry, pain is a uniquely 
inexpressible experience, because unlike desire, grief or love, physical pain takes no object. 
She writes that there is an exceptional character of pain when compared to all our other 
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interior states , we do not simply ‗have feelings‘ but have feelings for somebody or 
something, that love is love of x, fear is fear of y, ambivalence is ambivalence about z. If one 
were to move through all the emotional, perceptual, and somatic states that take an object – 
hatred for, seeing of, being hungry for – this list would become a very long one. This list and 
its implicit affirmation would, however, be suddenly interrupted when, moving through the 
human interior, one at last reached physical pain, for physical pain – unlike any other state of 
consciousness – has no referential content. It is not of or for anything. It is precisely because it 
takes no object that it, more than any other phenomenon, resists objectification in language 
(Scarry, 1985). 
 
 This atomistic model of individual human beings with their unique interior landscapes 
translates into the fundamental unsayability of pain, and the failure of pain to take an object 
means that we can only approach the pain of others with doubt. For Scarry (1985, p. 4), ―pain 
comes unsharably into our midst as at once that which cannot be denied and that which cannot 
be confirmed‖. Here, the possibilities for accurately or meaningfully expressing pain are 
always subject to the ever-present threat of their negation. As physical pain is seen to destroy 
the possibility of its own expression in language, the options for representing pain are limited 
to a range of visual practices that can only ever point to some trace – some visible cause that 
might point to the presence of pain in another (i.e. the emaciated body in starvation, the torn 
and bleeding body in war. In this sense, the drive to image the pain of others seeks to impart a 
certainty to experience that, in the Cartesian model, can ever only be marked by a radical 
doubt. It is from within the frame of doubt associated with pain that the drive to visualize 
correlative expressions of pain – rather than the pain itself – occurs.  For this reason, the 
visual expression of pain and trauma translates into a politics of representation that flattens 
the experience of pain by being able to capture only the visible causes or expressions of pain. 
One of the results of this is the development of an aesthetic imagery of pain-causing 
phenomena – an iconography of symbols that stand in for pain and thus become the 
representational alibis for actual pain: images of starvation, of emaciated concentration-camp 
victims, of hooded prisoners, of broken and bleeding skins, of blood-stained floors in prison 
cells, and so on.  
 
In the imaging of pain-causing phenomena and of bodies in pain, the specificity of the interior 
experience of pain, and of the subject that experiences it, is elided or even entirely evacuated. 
People become representations of their plights. As Feldman argues, we encounter 
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―generalities of bodies – dead, wounded, starving, diseased, and homeless. . .  In their 
pervasive depersonalization, [they appear as an] anonymous corporeality‖ (cited in Malkki, 
1996, p. 388). The fundamental inexpressibility of pain is the unsaid hypothesis on which a 
range of claims about torture, war, and death as primarily interior experiences (and thus 
doubtable experiences) are made possible. For Hannah Arendt, for example, the 
concentration-camp survivor, had he been able to return to narrate his experience, would not 
have been believed. The suffering in the camp as a space of profound and potentially limitless 
pain is understood to defy attempts at narration, because the capacity to express the content of 
that pain is understood to be severely curtailed. Arendt uses terms such as ‗unimaginable‘ to 
describe experiences that can never be fully embraced by the imagination, and that, as a 
consequence, can never be fully reported. In short, ―it is as though [the survivor] had a story 
to tell of another planet‖ (Arendt, 2000, p. 125). Similarly, she writes that ―anyone speaking 
or writing about the concentration camps is . . . regarded as suspect; and if the speaker has 
resolutely returned to the world of the living, he himself is often assailed by doubts with 
regard to his own truthfulness, as though he had mistaken a nightmare for reality‖ (Arendt, 
2000, p. 120).  Here, we see that pain and trauma are regarded as so fundamentally 
inaccessible and unshareable that any attempt at recounting one‘s experiences is haunted by 
the stark fact that one‘s suffering will always and necessarily be received by others with 
radical doubt.  
 
The poverty of communicating traumatic experience was also expressed by Walter Benjamin, 
who suggests that ―witnessing war takes away the ability to speak about it‖ (cited in 
Sliwinski, 2004, p. 151). Jenny Edkins (2003, p. 8) expresses a similar understanding with 
regard to trauma, writing that ―what we can say no longer makes sense; what we want to say, 
we can‘t. There are no words for it‖. Similarly, the act of witnessing others‘ pain (and deaths) 
is also fraught with an unsayability, because the witness is limited to only a modicum of 
access to the pain of the other body.  
 
To be sure, there is an ethical imperative here to mark the experience of trauma as both 
unique and exceptional – an imperative that, for all its ethical motivations, also works to 
further divide the pain-filled from the pain- less. Here, the witnessing of pain, because it is 
marked by the inability of the witness to experience the pain of the other body, can ever only 
be a partial witnessing. This is Levi‘s (1989) formulation of the differentiation between the 
drowned and the saved. The drowned cannot come back to bear witness to what happened to 
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them, and the saved are capable of only a partial witnessing. Of course, the possibility of 
perfect witnessing – of perfect affinity between the one who experiences pain and the one 
who witnesses it – is not only impossible, but also probably undesirable. The reasons for this 
undesirability are found not in the impossibility of experiencing the pain of the other, but 
rather in the immanent risk that the pain of others might be evacuated – through a refocusing 
on the self – from the realm of politics.  
 
The political imaginary of a world populated by Cartesian subjects who reach out to one 
another across a range of linguistic, sensory and experiential divides is a world in which 
expression will always be met with a grain of unknowability. This unknowability is 
articulated and reconfirmed through the production of the visual – through the artefacts of the 
world that will always provide an imperfect representation of a phenomenon that takes no 
worldly object. The inability to know that another is in pain, to believe another to be in pain, 
is maintained both by the disconnect between Cartesian subjects and in the disconnect 
between the watcher and the watched in the context of imagery (Malkki, 1996). The question 
of response and responsibility is thus posed within a context of fundamental inaccessibility, 
unbelievability and, in turn, political and ethical hopelessness (Sontag, 2003).   
 
Constrained already by the inaccessibility of the experience of pain in the body of another, the 
representation of pain and pain-causing events through photographic imagery can be seen to 
further inscribe this distance. Sliwinski (2004, p. 151) argues that ―despite the drive to narrate, 
at some point in the encounter with images, the viewer falls silent too, suggesting the 
technology demands narrative but also resists that demand‖. It is in this evacuated space that 
we attempt to make sense of the imagery we find before us. It is also because of this 
evacuation that the drive to narrate takes on a special urgency. Unsurprisingly, the visual 
symbolics of pain are the subject of fierce contestation. They are images not for the sake of 
imagery itself, but they assist in the conclusion of the narratives that come to be associated 
with the imagery. Images thus become part of the narrative-stabilization process that seeks to 
solidify stories that mobilize disparate and fragmented events into a matrix of meaning.  
 
One can trace the development and solidification of narratives around images, engaging in a n 
excavation of the ways in which facts have solidified around the fragmented visual 
representations of events. Bodily pain and death are shepherded into specific narratives that 
seek to combat terror through invasion and conquest. Imagery forms our dominant medium of 
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access to the pain of the other, and already works to qualify the nature or the necessity of the 
pain, particularly when pain enters political space. It is difficult to navigate the question of 
whether the repeated use of this imagery for projects that are considered by their authors to be 
just and/or ethical is not itself an integral component of the violence that produced the torture 
in the first place. The gaze enabled by the photograph also works as a sort of ‗hooding‘ of the 
subject, maintaining the inherently violent fantasy that we can see without being seen. This is 
the pornography of the war image, and here ―the obscenity lies in part in its public exhibition‖ 
(Malik, 2006, p. 110). Even where the display of the photographs is intended to generate 
opposition and resistance to the practices of torture, this pornographic element of seeing 
remains.  
 
The circulation of the imagery associated collective suffering cannot be separated from the 
violent production of that imagery in the first place, and this is so regardless of the 
intentionality associated with the circulation of these images. Sliwinski (2004, p. 154) argues 
that ―he helplessness and horror of bearing witness to suffering brings with it the demand for 
a response, and yet one‘s response to photographs can do nothing to alleviate the suffering 
depicte‖. Even the circulation of this imagery for the purposes of resistance is always subject 
to the objectification of suffering that the photograph produces. For Sliwinski (2004, p. 155),  
―in the painful encounter with the image lies the responsibility to recognize that individuals 
are represented in photographs, to recognize their suffering, but also a second responsibility: 
to recognize the impossibility of that recognition‖.  
 
There is no necessary politics associated with the images; and, in fact, the degree to which the 
photograph evacuates and flattens subjects requires us to either accept the avoidance of 
politics that the photograph announces or to actively attempt to reinsert a politics. For this 
reason, the ‗ethical‘ use of the imagery of torture and other atrocities is always in a state of 
absolute tension: the bodies in the photographs are still exposed to our gaze in ways that 
render them abject, nameless and humiliated – even when our goal in the use of that imagery 
is to oppose their condition. The imagery of their pain is still read by and for us, and this 
requires us to interrogate both how and why we are engaged in the circulation of the 
photographs. For Sliwinski (2004, p. 158), ―there is something to be seen and therefore 
known in images of suffering, but it is not the traumatic experiences of others. Rather we are 
asked to look and imagine their terror, but in this looking [we encounter our] own failure to 
see‖. Bal (2005, p. 159) expresses it this way: ―Compassion without an identification that is 
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both specific and heteropathic leads us to an emotional realm where the fear of violence can 
be made objectless‖.  
 
In the context of an originary disbelief surrounding the experience of others‘ pain, one can 
appreciate why the imagery becomes a necessary instrument towards a politics of resistance. 
For example, Scarry (1985, p. 9) argues that ―Amnesty International‘s ability to bring about 
the cessation of torture depends centrally on its ability to communicate the reality of physical 
pain to those who are not themselves in pain‖. Those bodies in pain must rely on our capacity 
to imagine this pain, which cannot be expressed and can only find an imperfect voice in 
rupturing moments that also work toward the building of narratives – that is, the photograph, 
the testimony, the symbolic aesthetic portrayal through art or poetry. The disconnect rests on 
the very foundations of our modes of knowing. Imagining requires us to think ourselves into 
the skins of others, and the consequence is that our looking both becomes and remains ours 
alone. For Sliwinski (2004, p. 153), this means that ―to look at the photographs – because one 
only looks – is to become directly culpable for the erasure of the other‘s singularity‖. It is thus 
that we find in certain instances the image that seems to capture a quintessential, 
transhistorical, collective pain, which in turn elides the specificity of the pain itself. The 
symbolic comes to stand in for the pain, even as it attempts to express what is real about pain, 
suffering and trauma.  
 
As such, the images that are produced, circulated and mobilized as iconic representations of 
war are profoundly depoliticizing. The shock and awe component of this imagery does not 
simply capture the objective facticity of those who find themselves trapped in conditions of 
extreme hurt and devastation. Rather, the shock and awe culture itself is reproduced through 
the circulation of that imagery and in the narratives that collect and solidify around the events 
that the images are made to articulate. There is an imperative here to reconsider both politics 
and ethics when confronted with images of the body in pain, and to rethink responsibility in 
each instance. In this way, we might remember that the photograph operates as a 
sociopolitical text, and is read and re-read in different ways toward the achievement of 
different narratives and projects. Henry Giroux (2004, p. 791) argues that ―photographic 
images must be engaged ethically as well as socio-politically because they are implicated in 
history and they often work to suppress the very conditions that produce them. Often framed 
within dominant forms of circulation and meaning, such images generally work to legitimate 
particular forms of recognition and meaning marked by disturbing forms of diversion and 
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evasion‖. It is worth considering the possibility that this imagery actually works to cordon off 
the pain of the sufferers and further distances them from us as the circulators and meaning-
producers of their plight.  
 
Does the circulation of this imagery for the purposes of normative political and educational 
projects automatically already include an ethical reflexivity? The circulation of this imagery 
cannot rely on ethical intention alone – or perhaps at all – because there is no single way to 
read the image and because we cannot escape the voyeurism and the objectification associated 
with its circulation. The use of images for ethical aims risks falling into the same trap as that 
which led to the desire to perpetrate and image the torture in the first place: the circulation of 
shattered bodies, in part, as political specimens for political projects. Given this, the following 
question seems to me to be crucial: what are the ethical implications of the circulation of the 
images of bodies in pain? I do not want to suggest that we should not be confronted with the 
world-shattering materiality of torture. Rather, I am interested in the ethics of the choices we 
make concerning how we express and interpret this materiality.  
 
It is clear that visual representation has the capacity to animate important forms of political 
resistance. It is precisely this that makes questioning the ethics of imagery difficult. The 
ability to maintain this position rests on the notion that there is a significant degree of ethical 
separation between the torture and the imaging and circulation of the imagery of torture, and 
that intention is of paramount importance. The increasing reliance on visuality to tell us about 
the world creates a disconnect that makes possible the claim that this imagery can be 
circulated ethically. By marking and framing the pain-producing event as that which happens 
to and in the other body, the photograph as visual artefact a lso works to propose and police a 
boundary between worlds of pain and non-pain, creating a rupture that may be 
insurmountable. In the context of the ongoing war and terror, this disjuncture becomes 
particularly pernicious. There is a risk here that the politics that are mobilized in response are 
primarily self referential, rather than other-regarding. The suffering of the other is emptied of 
its immanence, and reread back both to and by us in ways that work either to condemn or 
excuse – and in any event explain – the violent politics that caused the pain. But, in either 
case, consideration of that pain is quickly bypassed, and we are left with the ability only to 
point to the problem that caused it.  
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The risk in accessing the pain of the other in its own right as pain is the possibility of our 
consanguinity with him – to his presence in ourselves – to the possibility of recognizing and 
grieving that pain, even if it is also true that pain and grieving are themselves contextual and 
multifarious. We are always caught in a space of violence, in an ethics of decision whose 
consequences cannot be entirely calculated or managed, even when our goals are to minimize 
or oppose the violence that causes the pain. The circulation of this imagery as symbolic of the 
War on Terror is to dismiss both the specificities of the bodies in pain that are produced 
through the War on Terror, and the specificities of the War on Terror itself, which is a project 
with multiple – and equally unacceptable – violences.  
 
Again, this is not to deny that there is an imperative to convey the fact and the content and the 
consequences of violence on particular bodies. Indeed, bodies in pain speak in the vocative 
case of language, and they demand both response and accounting. The ability to engage in 
oppositional politics in the context of the war, or disaster is crucially important, and so I do 
not wish to argue in favour of iconoclasm, but to rather engage in the relatively modest 
enterprise of inquiring into how, why and with what effects we are employing these aesthetic 
technologies in our resistance efforts, and to ask ourselves what our answers might mean for 
others. This requires us to interrogate ourselves as both producers and consumers of this 
imagery. Our continuing reliance on imagery to impart an account of events - to identify the 
ethics either contained or called for in the image - is part of the process through which we 
deny our own presence in the reading and circulation of these images. In the erasure of 
ourselves as the authors of both the images and the readings, we are simultaneously engaged 
in an erasure of those who appear in the images themselves. In the process, there is a 
fetishization taking place - a pornography.  
 
Is it prudent, thoughtful or reserved the use of imagery or, conversely, its refusal? I want to 
consider the possibility that there is, in fact, no necessary insurmountable gulf between the 
one who experiences pain and the one who witnesses it. Rather, it is our increasingly sole 
reliance on imagery that helps to widen and confirm that disconnect. To think ethically is not 
only to think about the experience of the body in pain, but also to consider the possibilities for 
accessing and responding to that pain differently. The point here is that if we are always 
already fundamentally occupied by the other – by the other‘s desire, the other‘s pain, the 
other‘s grief - then the process of differentiation between ourselves and others becomes 
extremely murky. Indeed, the risk is that the distinction becomes meaningless. Other people‘s 
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violence becomes our own. Why, then, should we not understand the pain of others in some 
way, in some measure, as our own? I am aware of the danger that, in this paradigm, the pain 
of the tortured body becomes everyone‘s, and by extension, no one‘s. But, the point is not to 
reach a place from which we can no longer respond, or to reach a place where we can respond 
with a perfect ethicality (this is impossible). Rather, what is at stake here is the recognition 
that we must both convey the material reality of bodies in pain and seek to avoid relegation of 
that pain to other bodies in ways that cut off the possibilities for ethical response. It is to 
refocus our attention on the question of pain itself; of the ways in which it is inscribed and 
experienced; of the ways in which we seek to represent it; of the ways in which we think we 
might best access it; and, by extension, of the ways in which we might consider our uses of 
imagery and our range of options for response. 
 
 
III.3. Yuri Kozyrev: Aestheticization of the pain of others in war 
You’re right. I’m a photojournalist. I collect images of wars, of hunger and its ghosts, of 
natural disasters and terrible misfortunes. You can think of me as a witness. 
José Eduardo Agualusa 
 
Engaging with the literature on visual representations of human suffering, being a witness, 
and trauma, the current section analyzes the photography of Yuri Kozyrev and explores the 
conditions in which photography can succeed in disrupting stereotypical po litical 
interpretations in connection with the atrocity and collective pain and suffering. Art 
photography, it is argued, may help transform viewers from consuming spectators into 
participant witnesses who self-critically reflect upon their own subject positions in relation to 
the conditions depicted in the image while simultaneously being aware that an adequate 
response to the image is not possible. By discussing photography of war, the section 
acknowledges the unrepresentability of it; by focusing on visual representations, it reflects the 
extent to which political space is nowadays constituted by means of images; it contributes to 
the ―process of self-examination‖ demanded by Kofi Annan regarding the ways ―we 
collectively remember the tragedy‖ (Annan, 2004).   
 
Born in 1963, in Moscow, Yuri Kozyrev is a Russian war photographer. Kozyrev is based in 
Moscow, but spent an extended time in Baghdad for Time.As a photojournalist for the past 25 
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years, Yuri Kozyrev has witnessed many world-changing events. He started his career 
documenting the collapse of the Soviet Union, the last empire of our modern times, capturing 
the rapid changes in the former USSR for the LA Times during the 90‘s. In 2001 
Kozyrevstarted to cover international news. He was on the scene in Afghanistan after 
September 11, 2001, and lived in Baghdad, Iraq, between 2002 and 2009, arriving before the 
war. During those Iraqi years, he was a contract photographer for Time Magazine and 
travelled all over the country photographing different sides of the conflict. Since the 
beginning of 2011, Kozyrev has been photographed the uprising and the aftermaths in 
Bahrain, Yemen, Tunisia and especially Egypt and Libya. He has received numerous honors 
for his photography, including several World Press Photo, the OPC‘s Oliver Rebbot Award 
and the ICP Infinity Award for Photojournalism and in 2008 he received the Frontline Club 
Award for his extensive coverage of the Iraq war.  
His extensive body of work documenting the ―Arab Revolutions‖ received wide industry 
recognition. ―On Revolution Road‖- on the revolts in Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and Libya made 
for Time Magazine won the 2011 Visa d‘Or News at the International Festival of 
Photojournalism Visa pour l‘Image. In 2012 hos work was awarded at the World Press Foto 
Contest and he was named the 2011 Photographer of the Year in the Pictures of the Year 
International Competition. Kozyrev work has been widely exhibited. Some of his more recent 
exhibitions are ―Russie‖, a unique showcase of work from Russia exhibited together with 
Stanley Greene in Paris at La Maison de la Photographie ―Robert Doisneau‖ and the group 
exhibition ―Révolutions Arabes‖ curated by Alain Mingam.  
 
After 2011, when Yuri Kozyrev traveled to seven countries covering protests and uprisings 
for Time, including Egypt, Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, Russia, Greece and Tunisia, writes about 
the remarkable experience as a witness and what all the revolutions have in common: ―It‘s 
unique that I‘ve been able to cover all these uprisings and revolut ions during the year. I‘m 
lucky- it‘s incredibly complicated to understand where you need to go when you‘re on the 
ground, and I was lucky to have a lot of help. The protests were well under way when I got to 
Tahrir Square in late January, and their size and scope took my breath away: in two decades 
of covering the Middle East, I had never encountered anything like this. There was huge 
fighting between the pro-government supports and revolutionaries. Some of the journalists 
were beaten. Some of them lost their cameras. They kicked me out, but I managed to get back 
in the next morning. I saw a lot of families- not just young men or revolutionaries- and 
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everyone was helping each other, praying together. It was a great time. Everybody was 
waiting for Mubarak to make the right decision, and suddenly it happened. And it was so 
emotional: people crying, shouting, screaming…it was incredible. The next morning, it was 
over. The army was kicking everyone out. They weren‘t friendly—there was a feeling of 
‗You got what you wanted. Now, get out.‘ Of all the revolutions I covered, Egypt was the 
most special.‖ (Time, December 14, 2011). The story of Egypt is the story of crowds.  Until 
January 2011, its politics were the sterile, servile sort enforced by one-party states. But Tahrir 
Square changed that, and public affairs have refused to move indoors since. What Yuri 
Kozyrev has captured in these photos is the abrupt, almost neck-snapping changes that 
exploded in Cairo‘s public spaces.  First the city erupted in rejoicing in the hours after the 
Egyptian military removed President Mohamed Morsi from office July 3, his one-year tenure 
eclipsed by the most massive public demonstrations in the nation‘s history three days earlier.   
Now tens of thousands surged into Tahrir to cheer, bathed in the glow of fireworks and the 
green laser pointers sold in the square like corn on the cob. Thousands more piled into cars 
and honked their way through the streets of the capital in the kind of celebration normally 
seen after a World Cup final.  
Yuri Kozyrev: from the serie On the Road to Revolution  
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Afghanistan‘s transition out of war is not shaping up to be very peaceful. Every day seems to 
bring another militant attack and more civilian lives lost as Afghan forces struggle to take 
over security ahead of the pullout of most foreign troops next year. Powerful women are 
being targeted with violence and kidnapping in parts of the country that are slipping back 
under Taliban control, and the no one is quite sure what will happen come elections next 
spring, when long-time leader President Hamid Karzai has said he will step down from 
power. 
 
 
 
War photography is the new war poetry. ―What passing-bells for those who die as cattle?‖ 
(Owen, 1963, p. 44). The classic war photographers have all been portrait photographers in 
extremis. They sought the whites of the eyes, and tried to fathom what they found there. The 
original war poets did something very similar. Wilfred Owen wrote to his mother of the ―very 
strange look‖ he had seen on soldiers‘ faces at Étaples in 1917: ―… an incomprehensible look, 
which a man will never see in England. … It was not despair or terror, it was more terrible 
than terror, for it was a blindfold look, without expression, like a dead rabbit‘s. It will never 
be painted, and no actor will ever seize it. And to describe it, I think I must go back and be 
with them‖ (Owen, 1967, p. 521). The problem of the communicability or incommunicability 
Yuri Kozyrev: Ali Abbas  
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of suffering is nested in atrocity of all sorts, and irreducibly in war. ―Wasn‘t it noticeable at 
the end of the war that men who returned from the battlefield had grown silent - not richer but 
poorer in communicable experience?‖ (Benjamin, 2002, p.143-144). Walter Benjamin‘s 
observation of the First World War could apply to any war. The photographer is normally said 
to take a portrait. Portraits from the battlefield are not so much taken as frozen, as if wrung 
from the very soul of the subject. The look was seized, not by an actor, but by the camera. 
Once it had been captured on film, once it had been exposed, it could be seen, that is to say 
apprehended, as if for the first time. ―Photography is naïvely believed to reproduce visual 
reality‖, Janet Malcolm (2008) has observed, ―but in fact the images our eyes take in and the 
images the camera delivers are not the same. Taking a picture is a transformative act‖.  
 
 
 
 
The so called portraits taken by Kozyrev on the battlefield are just striking.  The look is blank, 
then, but revealing. The faces tell true. Telling, however, is not the only work it is doing. It is 
also asking. The faces ask something - demand something - something more than pity. For the 
survivors of the unsurpassable, pity will not suffice. The pre-eminent philosopher of the face-
as-demand is Emmanuel Levinas. For Levinas, ―the face is a fundamental event‖ (Levinas, 
quoted in Wright 1988, p. 168-169). As that oracular announcement might suggest, what 
Levinas calls ―the face‖ is not to be understood literally, or even metaphorically, but 
Yuri Kozyrev: from the serie On the Road to Revolution 
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poetically. Strictly speaking, it is a rhetorical figure. Thus, in one characteristic formulation, 
―the face is a hand in search of recompense, an open hand. That is, it needs something. It is 
going to ask you for something‖ (Levinas, quoted in Wright 1988, p. 168-169). It has been 
suggested that the face in Kozyrev‘s photographs, raises the unspoken question, ―How can 
this be? Or, more transgressively: ―Are we allowed to view what is being exposed?‖ (Levi 
Strauss, 2003, p. 7). Levinas insists on going further. For him, the face isa demand - a 
demand, not a question - which calls for an ethical response. From these premises he develops 
a number of suggestive ideas. In considering the face, he weighs its resources: ―There are 
these two strange things in the face: its extreme frailty - the fact of being without means - and, 
on the other hand, there is authority. It is as if God spoke through the face. … The face, then, 
is not the colour of the eyes, the shape of the nose, the ruddiness of the cheek‖ (Levinas , 
1996, p. 167). The face may be a face - a human face - but it may also be another part of the 
body, perhaps even a body part. In Life and Fate, as Levinas saw it, the face is the back, or 
the nape of the neck. ―Grossman isn‘t saying that the nape is the face‖, he explained in one 
interview, ―but that all the weakness, all the mortality, all the naked and disarmed mortality o f 
the other can be read from it‖ (Levinas, 2006, p. 201). In his own work, Levinas (1996, p. 
167) underlined the moral of the story: ―The face as the extreme precariousness of the other. 
Peace as awakeness to the precariousness of the other‖.  
 
Kozyrev follows the wars, and the massacres, inspecting the ground and the guilty secrets 
sown there. At first sight, some of his scenes look almost apocalyptical. These haunting 
images - ―chronotopia‖ as Norfolk calls them - are meditations on the ethics of response and 
responsibility. ―Art historical references may be intriguing‖, he writes in a collection of his 
photographs of Afghanistan, ―but the destruction of Afghanistan is first and foremost a human 
tragedy in which millions lost their lives. The people killed in these attacks leave almost no 
record - only the forensic traces survive to tell of the carnage‖ (Norfolk 2002, p.38). They are 
his way of saying to the other, buried and unburied, ―Here I am.‖ Still, Kozyrev uses light to 
create eerie, cinematic, or painterly images. The images are very strong, but the light exposure 
makes them endurable and less viscerally provoking.  
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Yuri Kozyrev: Untitled (The Conflict of Osetia) 
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Conclusions 
It was not my intention to present the artworks I analyzed as final answers to many 
dilemmasone might stumble across when witnessing pain. Rather, I aimed to provide a wider 
frame forsuch dilemmas. Art and artistic creativity cannot be expected to simply provide the 
answer tohow to live with pain around us and inside us, but rather to relinquish morally 
chargedviewpoints on pain and open the space for further inquiry.  
Nowadays one finds images of pain and violence not onlyin the domain of art, but also in 
mass media, often accompanied by an already formed moralassessment. Nevertheless, it was 
art, not mass media, which seemed to me the best medium tomake readers aware of the 
presence of pain. Art reading involves the process of choosingbetween various approaches, 
placing artwork in certain contexts, building strategies andmodels, specifying points of view, 
checking and updating one‘s knowledge with a new vision.Images are substitutes – they are 
always placed and located in spaces of human use, meaningsand values. They correspond not 
so much to things as to sensations, perceptions andconceptions.  
It has been my aim to trace how objects convey meanings and how thosemeanings are not 
only mediated, but in large part activated by cultural convention. I havepointed out that even 
primary reading involves cultural codings. One central deficiency ofmany definitions in art 
history is that they convey the assumption that narrative exists inhermetic isolation, that it 
narrates itself. The artworks on pain presentedhereundermine that assumption.  
I presented different kinds of pain: the result of accident, of illness, of war, or the reflection of 
amental state. I looked at the pain inflicted by others or to a certain extent self- induced. The 
research traces the self-mapping of the body in pain through abandoning the conception of 
pain evading language: as long as wesee pain as an activity of the body only, and language as 
a function of the mind, pain willcontinue to resist that language. Instead of falling back on 
literary metaphors and adjectives tobridge the gap between bodies feeling pain and looking at 
pain, one might become aware ofpain while looking at art presenting bodies in crisis. 
Catching the represented body in theprocess of dematerialization, decay and destruction 
provides deeper knowledge on theconcept of suffering. The self in pain undergoes many 
differentiated stages of being and inbetweenstates of transition. While pain should be taken 
into account as a major incentive forany transformation the subject may undergo, I have also 
pointed out how the subject in pain isoften ungraspable and fluid, and at the same time how 
easily that subject can beconceptualized as victimized and marginal.  
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The argument advanced in the section about collective trauma is simple and without solution: 
I suggest that the mobilization of violent imagery produces an irresolvable ethical dilemma. 
There is a necessary and perhaps unavoidable violence in the reproduction and circulation of 
imagery associated with war, butalso an equally urgent imperative to oppose torture and war. 
We should not, however, dismiss this tension simply because it is unavoidable. Rather, what I 
advocate here is a consideration of the use of this imagery; a reflection on whether it is indeed 
always necessary in order to engage in political resistance in the name of ethics. I have argued 
that the Cartesian imaginary that posits pain as a fundamentally interior phenomenon that is 
expressed only imperfectly through the instruments of language severely constrains the ways 
in which we are able to conceive of ethical engagement with the body in pain. Produced in a 
culture that relies fundamentally on visuality for its political bearings, the image constrains 
the possibilities for recognizing and responding to the pain of others, and thus returns to us a 
flattened representation that actually evacuates the image of the one in pain. Images do not 
speak for themselves – they are made to speak for, by and about us. We are asking these 
bodies to do political work for us, we use the war photos not just means of memory, but even 
as a purge, a catharsis.   
 
The tension inherent in the Cartesian model of subjectivity asks us to think about the problem 
of pain differently; it asks us to consider the possibility that pain is not an interior, private 
state, but a shared and shareable phenomenon that is expressible and accessible in a fully 
social and intersubjective way. This awareness provides us the opportunity to recognize some 
of the more pernicious effects of the use of imagery of atrocity.  
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